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Authoritarian	  Populist	  was	  a	  label	  often	  hung	  on	  the	  Thatcher	  governments	  of	  the	  1980s.	  	  Although	  
the	  UK	  political	  landscape	  has	  changed	  enormously	  since	  1990,	  the	  popular	  sentiments	  that	  
underpinned	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  repeated	  electoral	  successes	  remain	  remarkably	  strong	  among	  
British	  voters	  today.	  	  The	  paper	  uses	  extensive	  survey	  evidence	  to	  characterise	  what	  Authoritarian	  
Populism	  means	  for	  voters	  in	  Britain	  today.	  	  The	  analysis	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  beliefs,	  
held	  by	  a	  surprisingly	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  UK	  electorate,	  which	  can	  reasonably	  be	  described	  as	  
Authoritarian	  Populist.	  	  These	  beliefs	  focus	  on	  the	  strong	  role	  that	  Britain	  should	  play	  in	  the	  world,	  
cynicism	  about	  the	  operation	  of	  EU	  institutions,	  a	  virulent	  opposition	  to	  human	  rights,	  negative	  views	  
towards	  immigration,	  and	  preferences	  for	  lower	  taxes	  and	  a	  smaller	  state.	  	  The	  analysis	  also	  shows	  
that	  (controlling	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  relevant	  factors)	  these	  views	  have	  important	  
consequences	  for	  patterns	  of	  party	  support,	  for	  likely	  voting	  in	  the	  forthcoming	  referendum	  on	  the	  
EU,	  for	  (dis)satisfaction	  with	  British	  democracy,	  and	  for	  attitudes	  towards	  courts.	  
	  
In	   the	  1980s,	   it	  was	   fashionable	  among	   leftist	   thinkers	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  Europe	  to	  describe	  Margaret	  
Thatcher	   as	   an	   authoritarian	   populist,	   and	   ‘Thatcherism’	   as	   an	   authoritarian	   populist	   ideology	  
(Jessop	  et	  al,	  1984).	   	  The	  core	   image	  that	  this	  characterisation	  conveyed	  was	  that	  Thatcher	  herself	  
was	  an	  authoritarian	  (as	  a	  leader	  she	  was	  unprepared	  to	  brook	  opposition	  either	  within	  her	  party	  or	  
in	  the	  country	  at	   large);	   that	  she	  appealed	  to	  the	  authoritarian	   instincts	  of	  a	  substantial	  section	  of	  
the	  British	  electorate	   (she	  advocated	  popular	  but	   illiberal	  policies	  on	  civil	   rights	  and	   immigration);	  
that	  she	  favoured	  an	  aggressive	  authoritarian	  stance	  in	  Britain’s	  dealings	  with	  foreign	  governments	  
(witness	  her	  confrontations	  with	  Argentina	  over	  the	  	  Falklands	  and	  with	  the	  EU	  over	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
UK’s	   budget	   contribution);	   and	   that	   she	  was	  wedded	   to	   a	   set	   of	   neoliberal	   economic	   beliefs	   and	  
policies	  that	  sought	  to	  reduce	  the	  role	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  state	  in	  British	  life.	  
What	  is	  intriguing	  about	  the	  analyses	  of	  authoritarian	  populism	  conducted	  during	  the	  Thatcher	  years	  
is	  that	  they	  were	  based	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  interpretative	  (and	  frequently	  highly	  selective)	  
accounts	  of	  what	  Thatcher	  and	  her	  coterie	  of	  close	  advisers	  and	  confidantes	  said	  and	  thought.	  	  	  
Almost	  no	  attention	  was	  paid	  to	  how	  far	  Thatcher’s	  presumed	  worldview	  was	  shared	  by	  the	  British	  
public	  and	  what	  consequences	  that	  might	  have.	  	  It	  was	  enough	  to	  assert	  that	  Thatcherism	  was	  a	  
form	  of	  authoritarian	  populism;	  that	  it	  appealed	  to	  sufficient	  numbers	  of	  voters	  to	  elect	  a	  series	  of	  
Conservative	  governments	  after	  1979;	  and	  that	  the	  left	  needed	  to	  develop	  an	  ‘alternative	  narrative’	  
that	  could	  challenge	  the	  ideological	  dominance	  of	  neo-­‐liberalism	  (Hall	  and	  Jacques,	  1983).	  	  Following	  
Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  resignation	  in	  1990,	  debates	  about	  authoritarian	  populism	  waned.	  The	  electoral	  
successes	  of	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  parties	  in	  several	  EU	  countries	  over	  the	  last	  quarter	  century	  and	  the	  
relative	  popularity	  of	  UKIP	  in	  Britain	  in	  the	  last	  decade,	  however,	  have	  ensured	  that	  debates	  about	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populism	  have	  not	  disappeared	  (Goodwin	  and	  Ford,	  2014).	  	  In	  the	  wider	  European	  context,	  anti-­‐
immigrant/anti-­‐EU	  parties	  have	  made	  successful	  populist	  appeals	  to	  substantial	  (though	  still	  
minority)	  parts	  of	  the	  electorates,	  inter	  alia,	  in	  France,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Italy,	  Austria,	  Greece	  and	  
Hungary.	  	  	  Serious	  empirical	  analyses	  of	  the	  bases	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  parties	  
have	  been	  conducted,	  suggesting	  that	  this	  support	  is	  typically	  rooted	  in	  a	  rejection	  of	  contemporary	  
liberal	  politics	  and	  discourse	  (Wodak,	  KhosraviNik	  and	  Mral,	  2013).	  	  Right	  wing	  populism	  thrives	  
among	  those	  who	  feel	  that	  their	  opinions	  and	  interests	  have	  been	  over-­‐ridden	  by	  a	  mainstream	  
party	  system	  that	  is	  so	  concerned	  to	  protect	  minority	  rights	  (and	  often	  ethnic	  minority	  rights)	  that	  
they	  feel	  both	  politically	  dispossessed	  and	  economically	  left	  behind	  (Jones,	  2007).	  	  Partly	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  all	  this,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  populism	  almost	  invariably	  carries	  negative	  connotations	  –	  the	  idea	  
that	  there	  is	  something	  morally	  disreputable	  or	  even	  repugnant	  about	  both	  its	  proponents	  and	  its	  
supporters.	  	  Authoritarian	  Populism,	  if	  anything,	  is	  even	  worse.	  	  Not	  only	  are	  unpleasant	  views	  being	  
articulated	  or	  supported,	  but	  they	  are	  infected	  with	  an	  authoritarian	  mind-­‐set	  that	  is	  dismissive	  of	  
counter-­‐opinion	  and	  prepared	  to	  use	  all	  means	  possible	  to	  achieve	  the	  populists’	  (morally	  suspect)	  
policy	  goals.	  Yet	  for	  the	  populists	  themselves,	  and	  for	  their	  electoral	  supporters,	  this	  characterisation	  
is	  almost	  wholly	  false.	  	  For	  them,	  to	  be	  populist	  is	  simply	  to	  articulate	  or	  support	  popular	  views	  –	  
perhaps	  politically	  incorrect	  ones	  –	  that	  liberals	  and	  socialists	  don’t	  like.	  
This	  paper	  seeks	  to	  use	  the	  term	  authoritarian	  populism	  in	  a	  politically	  neutral	  way	  focusing	  on	  its	  
character,	  its	  sources	  and	  its	  consequences.	  	  Using	  evidence	  from	  a	  representative	  multi-­‐wave	  panel	  
survey	  of	  the	  UK	  electorate	  between	  2011	  and	  2015,	  it	  seeks	  to	  specify	  in	  very	  precise	  terms	  what	  
authoritarian	  populism	  means	  in	  contemporary	  British	  politics.1	  	  As	  we	  show,	  it	  is	  a	  constellation	  of	  
attitudes	  and	  beliefs	  concerning	  immigration,	  Britain’s	  role	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy,	  the	  role	  
of	  civil	  liberties	  laws	  and	  punishment	  in	  protecting	  individual	  and	  collective	  interests,	  and	  ideological	  
self-­‐placements.	  	  Crucially,	  we	  attempt	  to	  assess	  the	  size	  of	  the	  group	  that	  can	  be	  reasonably	  
characterised	  as	  ‘authoritarian	  populist’	  in	  its	  political	  views.	  	  We	  estimate	  that	  authoritarian	  
populists	  constitute	  just	  over	  half	  of	  the	  UK	  adult	  population	  –	  that	  they	  are	  much	  more	  numerous	  
than	  the	  12.6%	  vote	  share	  obtained	  by	  UKIP	  in	  the	  2015	  UK	  general	  election	  would	  suggest.	  	  The	  
second	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  explores	  the	  sources	  of	  authoritarian	  populist	  views,	  outlining	  it	  
demographic	  and	  other	  correlates.	  	  The	  final	  part	  shows	  why	  authoritarian	  populism	  matters	  so	  
much	  in	  contemporary	  British	  politics	  by	  examining	  the	  attitudinal	  and	  behavioural	  consequences	  of	  
holding	  authoritarian	  populist	  beliefs.	  	  Authoritarian	  populism	  provides	  an	  important	  reservoir	  of	  
electoral	  support	  for	  both	  UKIP	  and	  the	  Conservatives.	  	  Controlling	  for	  a	  range	  of	  other	  theoretically	  
relevant	  variables,	  it	  is	  hugely	  important	  as	  a	  predictor	  of	  intended	  EU	  referendum	  voting;	  it	  
significantly	  increases	  dissatisfaction	  with	  democracy;	  and,	  somewhat	  ironically,	  it	  is	  associated	  with	  
negative	  views	  about	  the	  influence	  exerted	  by	  the	  judiciary	  in	  UK	  politics.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  survey	  was	  conducted	  by	  YouGov	  across	  10	  waves	  as	  follows:	  
Wave	  1:	  	  November	  2011,	  2760	  respondents	  
Wave	  2:	  April/May	  2012,	  2396	  all	  panel	  
Wave	  3:	  	  February	  2013,	  2014	  all	  panel	  
Wave	  4:	  July/August	  2013,	  1940	  panel,	  804	  top	  up	  
Wave	  5:	  March	  2014,	  2454	  panel	  respondents;	  2669	  fresh	  respondents	  
Wave	  6:	  May	  2014,	  4027	  panellists	  
Wave	  7:	  June	  2014,	  3821	  panellists	  




1.	  Operationalising	  contemporary	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
As	  indicated	  above,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  (AP)	  derives	  largely	  from	  an	  
intellectual	  tradition	  that	  is	  content	  to	  assert	  things	  without	  the	  need	  to	  subject	  them	  to	  rigorous	  
empirical	  scrutiny.	  	  Populism	  (invariably	  of	  the	  political	  right)	  was	  not	  so	  much	  subject	  to	  systematic	  
analysis,	  as	  repeatedly	  used	  as	  a	  term	  of	  academic	  and	  political	  abuse.	  	  Populist	  leaders	  were	  held	  to	  
make	  appeals	  over	  the	  heads	  of	  ‘civil	  society	  organisations’	  directly	  to	  voters’	  basest	  concerns	  about	  
the	  integrity	  of	  the	  nation	  and	  unwarranted	  intrusions	  in	  its	  internal	  affairs	  by	  outside	  agents,	  their	  
fears	  about	  foreigners	  (later	  to	  be	  overtaken	  by	  fears	  about	  immigrants),	  and	  the	  threats	  posed	  by	  
left-­‐wing	  ideologies	  (Dix,	  1985).	  	  	  The	  authoritarian	  component	  in	  the	  mix	  derived	  from	  a	  
preparedness	  by	  such	  leaders	  to	  use	  severe	  repression	  in	  support	  of	  their	  political	  ends.	  	  That	  
repression	  in	  turn	  was	  both	  justified	  and	  sold	  to	  the	  public	  in	  terms	  of	  (a)	  the	  permanent	  risk	  that	  
civil	  liberties	  would	  degenerate	  into	  civil	  licence	  and	  ungovernable	  anarchy	  and	  (b)	  the	  need	  for	  a	  
punitive	  judicial	  system	  that	  would	  preserve	  civil	  order.	  	  	  
These	  ideas	  were	  picked	  up	  again	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  developed	  by	  leftist	  commentators	  interested	  in	  
understanding	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  efforts	  to	  embed	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  approach	  to	  politics	  and	  
economics	  in	  Britain	  and,	  if	  possible,	  in	  the	  wider	  world	  (Scase,	  1980;	  Barnett,	  1982).	  Thatcher’s	  
authoritarian	  populism	  was	  built	  on	  four	  pillars	  and	  added	  a	  fifth	  as	  it	  progressed.	  First,	  ideologically,	  
she	  wanted	  to	  ‘roll	  back	  the	  state’	  and	  expose	  economic	  activities	  in	  Britain	  to	  what	  she	  regarded	  as	  
the	  energising	  forces	  of	  the	  market	  –	  hence	  her	  relentless	  pursuit	  of	  privatisation	  and	  her	  
determination	  to	  ‘curb	  the	  unions’	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  their	  ability	  to	  hamper	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  
British	  industry	  and	  commerce	  (Thatcher,	  1993).	  	  Second,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  UK’s	  role	  in	  world	  politics,	  
Thatcher	  wanted	  ‘to	  put	  the	  Great	  back	  in	  Britain’	  by	  adopting	  a	  more	  forceful	  approach	  to	  
international	  and	  security	  affairs	  –	  a	  role	  that	  she	  pursued	  with	  relish	  in	  the	  1982	  Falklands	  crisis	  and	  
in	  her	  dealings	  with	  Ronald	  Reagan	  in	  challenging	  Soviet	  global	  influence	  throughout	  the	  1980s	  
(Sanders,	  1990).	  	  Third,	  Thatcher’s	  innate	  parochialism	  led	  to	  her	  having	  strong	  convictions	  about	  
the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  immigration	  for	  British	  society	  –	  she	  even	  spoke	  publicly	  on	  one	  
occasion	  of	  communities	  being	  swamped	  by	  immigrants	  –	  a	  view	  that	  many	  observers	  believed	  
resonated	  with	  large	  numbers	  of	  British	  voters	  (Moore,	  2015).	  	  Fourth,	  Thatcher	  held	  strong	  doubts	  
about	  the	  value	  of	  laws	  protecting	  civil	  liberties	  that	  could	  be	  easily	  exploited	  by	  criminals	  and	  other	  
undesirables:	  although	  she	  was	  an	  economic	  liberal,	  she	  was	  a	  social	  authoritarian	  (Moore,	  2015).	  
Finally,	  and	  this	  developed	  as	  her	  premiership	  progressed,	  Thatcher	  was	  a	  Eurosceptic.	  	  Although	  she	  
was	  prepared	  to	  negotiate	  (successfully)	  with	  Europe	  to	  secure	  a	  ‘fairer	  budget	  deal	  for	  the	  UK’	  at	  
Fontainbleu	  in	  1984	  and	  to	  sign	  up	  to	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	  (which	  extended	  the	  reach	  of	  free	  
market	  mechanisms	  within	  the	  EU)	  in	  1986,	  she	  remained	  strongly	  opposed	  to	  the	  EEC’s	  founding	  
principle	  of	  ‘ever	  closer	  union’,	  believing	  that	  the	  EU	  should	  be	  an	  association	  of	  independent	  
sovereign	  states	  cooperating	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  ensuring	  free	  trade	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  barriers	  to	  
genuine	  economic	  competition	  in	  goods	  and	  services	  (Moore	  2015).	  
In	  terms	  of	  contemporary	  authoritarian	  populist	  appeals,	  the	  key	  issue	  is	  how	  far	  these	  ideas	  
resonate	  with	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  UK	  today.	  	  Table	  1	  describes	  the	  variables	  that	  we	  use	  to	  
operationalize	  the	  five	  components	  of	  AP	  outlined	  above.	  	  In	  order	  to	  measure	  ideological	  sympathy	  
for	  market	  mechanisms	  of	  distribution	  and	  the	  rolling	  back	  of	  the	  state	  –	  in	  effect,	  economic	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liberalism	  –	  we	  use	  the	  respondent’s	  self-­‐placement	  on	  a	  left-­‐right	  scale,	  where	  low	  values	  connote	  
a	  left-­‐wing	  and	  high	  values	  a	  right-­‐wing	  position.	  	  To	  measure	  preferences	  towards	  Britain’s	  global	  
role	  we	  use	  a	  dummy	  variable	  that	  distinguishes	  between	  those	  respondents	  who,	  given	  a	  choice	  of	  
various	  alternative	  foreign	  policy	  roles,	  believe	  that	  Britain	  can	  best	  protect	  its	  interests	  by	  being	  
‘strong	  and	  tough	  with	  other	  nations	  and	  maintaining	  a	  powerful	  military’	  –	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  assess	  people’s	  attitudes	  towards	  immigration,	  we	  use	  a	  standard	  ‘emotional	  reactions’	  
battery	  of	  questions	  that	  asks	  respondents	  to	  specify	  which	  emotions	  they	  associate	  with	  
immigration.	  	  Our	  measure	  is	  simply	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  number	  of	  negative	  emotions	  (unease,	  anxiety,	  
fear,	  disgust)	  that	  respondents	  indicate	  they	  feel.	  	  We	  measure	  critical	  attitudes	  towards	  human	  
rights	  through	  a	  Likert	  scale	  that	  assesses	  agreement/disagreement	  with	  the	  proposition	  that	  
‘People	  who	  talk	  about	  human	  rights	  are	  mainly	  interested	  in	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  criminals	  not	  
those	  of	  their	  victims’.	  	  Finally,	  critical	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  European	  Union	  are	  captured	  using	  a	  
variable	  that	  asks	  respondents	  to	  indicate	  how	  far	  they	  approve	  or	  disapprove	  of	  the	  UK’s	  
membership	  of	  the	  EU.	  
Table	  2	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  a	  simple	  exploratory	  factor	  analysis	  of	  the	  variables	  described	  in	  Table	  
1.	  	  The	  pattern	  of	  factor	  loadings	  shows	  that	  all	  five	  variables	  load	  highly	  on	  a	  single	  (first)	  factor,	  
strongly	  suggesting	  that	  they	  reflect	  a	  single	  underlying	  dimension	  that	  can	  be	  reasonably	  
characterised	  as	  an	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  scale.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  confirmed	  by	  a	  simple	  alpha	  scale	  
test,	  which	  produces	  a	  reliability	  coefficient	  of	  0.75	  (above	  the	  conventional	  test	  cut-­‐off	  of	  α>.7).	  If	  
we	  accept	  that	  the	  resultant	  alpha	  scale	  does	  indeed	  measure	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  hold	  
authoritarian	  populist	  views,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  use	  the	  component	  indicator	  variables	  in	  order	  to	  try	  
to	  estimate	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  electorate	  that	  can	  reasonably	  be	  characterised	  as	  ‘authoritarian	  
populists’.	  	  There	  are	  various	  ways	  of	  making	  such	  estimates.	  	  Here,	  we	  use	  simple	  cluster	  analysis	  in	  
order	  to	  assess	  if	  there	  are	  distinctive	  groups	  of	  voters	  who	  cluster	  together	  in	  their	  attitudes	  across	  
the	  five	  component	  variables.	  
Table	  3	  summarises	  the	  results	  of	  a	  series	  of	  cluster	  analyses	  that	  begin	  with	  a	  2-­‐cluster	  solution	  for	  
the	  five	  component	  variables	  and	  proceed	  through	  to	  a	  5-­‐cluster	  solution.	  	  The	  cell	  entries	  (for	  each	  
cluster	  set	  A,	  B,	  C,	  D)	  show	  the	  variations	  in	  average	  scores	  among	  the	  respondents	  that	  belong	  to	  
each	  cluster	  across	  each	  of	  the	  component	  variables.	  	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  2-­‐cluster	  solution,	  
the	  average	  score	  on	  ‘Britain	  should	  be	  strong	  and	  tough’	  for	  respondents	  who	  belong	  to	  cluster	  A1	  
is	  0.43,	  compared	  with	  a	  score	  of	  0.16	  for	  respondents	  who	  belong	  to	  cluster	  A2;	  similarly,	  the	  
average	  score	  on	  EU	  Disapproval	  is	  3.81	  for	  cluster	  A1	  respondents	  and	  2.34	  for	  those	  in	  cluster	  in	  
A2;	  the	  average	  scores	  on	  Rights	  Protect	  Criminals	  (3.84	  versus	  2.55),	  on	  Negative	  Immigration	  
Emotions	  (2.09	  versus	  0.74)	  and	  on	  Right-­‐Wing	  Ideology	  (6.65	  versus	  3.44)	  are	  all	  substantially	  
higher	  among	  cluster	  A1	  respondents	  than	  they	  are	  in	  cluster	  A2.	  	  All	  these	  differences	  are	  highly	  
statistically	  significant.	  Indeed,	  the	  pattern	  of	  differentiation	  is	  so	  consistent	  that	  we	  would	  
characterise	  the	  individuals	  who	  belong	  to	  cluster	  A1	  (52%	  of	  our	  sample)	  as	  ‘Authoritarian	  Populist’;	  
by	  implication,	  respondents	  in	  cluster	  A2	  would	  be	  ‘not	  Authoritarian	  Populist’	  (48%).	  	  	  
The	  3-­‐cluster	  solution	  shown	  in	  the	  B	  segment	  of	  Table	  3	  produces	  a	  very	  similar	  result	  to	  that	  in	  the	  
2-­‐cluster	  segment.	  It	  retains	  the	  same	  group	  of	  ‘not	  Authoritarian	  Populists’	  in	  cluster	  B3	  (as	  in	  A2)	  
but	  differentiates	  between	  two	  very	  similar	  groups	  of	  APs	  in	  clusters	  B1	  and	  B2	  –	  with	  the	  group	  in	  
cluster	  B2	  holding	  slightly	  more	  extreme	  views	  on	  all	  five	  measured	  component	  variables	  than	  their	  
counterparts	  in	  cluster	  B1.	  	  The	  4-­‐cluster	  solution	  in	  the	  C	  segment	  of	  Table	  3	  retains	  the	  same	  two	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(very	  similar)	  groups	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populists	  as	  in	  segment	  B	  but	  further	  differentiates	  between	  
two	  groups	  of	  not-­‐APs,	  with	  cluster	  C4	  exhibiting	  the	  lowest	  average	  scores	  on	  all	  four	  component	  
variables.	  	  Crucially,	  respondents	  in	  clusters	  C3	  and	  C4	  all	  exhibit	  attitude	  patterns	  that	  indicate	  their	  
rejection	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism:	  they	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  Britain	  should	  act	  in	  a	  ‘strong	  and	  
tough’	  manner	  on	  the	  world	  stage;	  they	  approve	  of	  the	  EU;	  they	  take	  a	  positive	  view	  of	  human	  
rights;	  they	  are	  not	  fearful	  of	  immigration	  and	  they	  place	  themselves	  very	  much	  on	  the	  left	  of	  the	  
political	  spectrum.	  	  Finally,	  the	  5-­‐cluster	  solution	  retains	  the	  two	  clearly	  not-­‐AP	  clusters	  in	  D4	  and	  D5	  
but	  identifies	  a	  very	  small	  group	  (D3)	  which	  has	  most	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
(the	  group	  exhibits	  high	  scores	  on	  Britain	  Strong	  and	  Tough,	  EU	  Disapproval,	  Rights	  Protect	  Criminals	  
and	  Negative	  Immigration	  Emotions)	  but	  whose	  members	  position	  themselves	  on	  the	  left	  side	  of	  the	  
political	  spectrum	  (average	  score	  3.11).	  	  We	  are	  broadly	  agnostic	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  this	  small	  
group	  (which	  represents	  only	  3%	  of	  our	  sample)	  is	  ‘genuinely	  Authoritarian	  Populist’.	  If	  they	  are	  
counted	  as	  APs	  (since	  they	  look	  like	  APs	  on	  four	  of	  our	  five	  components),	  then	  as	  noted	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  2-­‐cluster	  solution,	  APs	  represent	  roughly	  52%	  of	  the	  UK	  electorate;	  if	  they	  are	  not,	  then	  APs	  
represent	  around	  49%.	  	  The	  key	  point,	  given	  either	  interpretation,	  is	  that	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
represents	  a	  world-­‐view	  exhibited	  by	  roughly	  half	  the	  UK	  adult	  population.	  	  This	  is	  a	  large	  body	  of	  
opinion	  by	  any	  standards,	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  which	  need	  properly	  to	  be	  understood.	  	  In	  the	  
remaining	  sections	  of	  this	  paper,	  we	  explore,	  first,	  the	  sources	  of	  these	  authoritarian	  populist	  
dispositions	  and,	  second,	  their	  attitudinal	  and	  behavioural	  consequences.	  	  
	  
2.	  Why	  do	  (some)	  people	  embrace	  Authoritarian	  Populism?	  
It	  is	  extraordinarily	  difficult	  to	  establish	  why	  people	  think	  the	  things	  they	  do.	  We	  make	  no	  pretence	  
here	  to	  provide	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  theory	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  in	  Britain.	  	  However,	  
we	  are	  able	  to	  consider	  the	  roles	  played	  (1)	  by	  different	  demographic	  factors,	  (2)	  by	  exposure	  to	  
certain	  media	  sources,	  and	  (3)	  by	  more	  general	  social	  attitudes,	  particularly	  beliefs	  about	  the	  family.	  	  
As	  with	  any	  consideration	  of	  potential	  causal	  effects	  using	  survey	  data,	  we	  fully	  recognise	  the	  risks	  of	  
endogeneity	  –	  the	  possibility	  that	  variables	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  a	  given	  equation	  may	  co-­‐determine	  each	  
other.	  	  Unfortunately,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  suitable	  instrumental	  variables	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  deal	  
explicitly	  with	  potential	  endogeneity.	  	  We	  accordingly	  specify	  a	  very	  simple	  statistical	  model,	  
justified	  primarily	  on	  theoretical	  grounds,	  which	  assumes	  one-­‐way	  causation.	  
The	  first	  set	  of	  factors	  that	  might	  engender	  an	  AP	  mind-­‐set	  relates	  to	  demographics.	  The	  basic	  
demographic	  profile	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populists	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  described	  in	  Table	  4.	  	  For	  presentational	  
purposes,	  we	  use	  a	  dummy	  variable	  derived	  from	  the	  2-­‐cluster	  solution	  described	  in	  Table	  3	  as	  our	  
measure	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism/not.	  	  	  Recall	  that	  using	  this	  measure	  52%	  of	  our	  sample	  can	  be	  
characterised	  as	  AP.	  The	  cell	  entries	  in	  Table	  4	  accordingly	  need	  to	  be	  set	  against	  this	  52%	  baseline	  in	  
order	  to	  assess	  whether	  APs	  are	  disproportionately	  over-­‐	  or	  under-­‐represented	  in	  different	  socio-­‐
demographic	  groups.	  As	  the	  table	  shows,	  the	  differences	  by	  gender	  (51%	  of	  males	  are	  AP	  compared	  
with	  53%	  of	  women)	  are	  non-­‐significant.	  	  However,	  authoritarian	  populist	  attitudes	  are	  significantly	  
less	  prevalent	  among	  ethnic	  minorities	  (only	  40%	  are	  categorised	  as	  AP),	  among	  the	  more	  highly	  
educated	  (45%),	  in	  the	  middle	  class	  (46%),	  among	  trade	  unionists	  (28%),	  among	  public	  sector	  
workers	  (48%)	  and	  in	  the	  young	  (39%	  among	  the	  under-­‐30s).	  	  None	  of	  these	  findings	  is	  particularly	  
surprising	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  liberal	  and	  left-­‐wing	  attitudes	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  prevalent	  among	  these	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groups	  –	  and	  by	  implication	  we	  would	  expect	  to	  find	  lower	  levels	  of	  AP	  among	  them	  too	  (Heath,	  
Jowell	  and	  Curtice,	  1994;	  Clarke	  et	  al,	  2004).	  	  The	  variations	  in	  authoritarian	  populism	  level	  by	  region	  
are	  similarly	  unsurprising:	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  AP	  are	  found	  in	  the	  Midlands	  and	  in	  the	  north	  and	  
east	  of	  England,	  and	  the	  lowest	  levels	  in	  the	  South-­‐West	  and	  in	  Wales	  and	  Scotland.	  	  The	  relatively	  
low	  numbers	  of	  cases	  in	  each	  of	  the	  regional	  groupings	  means	  that	  these	  differences	  need	  to	  be	  
treated	  with	  caution.	  	  Accordingly,	  when	  we	  return	  to	  the	  role	  of	  regional	  effects	  in	  our	  multivariate	  
analysis	  below,	  we	  restrict	  our	  investigation	  to	  only	  the	  strongest	  (positive	  or	  negative)	  regional	  
effects	  shown	  in	  Table	  4	  –	  those	  relating	  to	  the	  West	  Midlands	  (60%	  AP)	  and	  to	  Scotland(46%	  AP)	  
and	  Wales	  (35%	  AP).	  
Table	  5	  describes	  our	  second	  and	  third	  sets	  of	  factors	  that	  could	  potentially	  influence	  Authoritarian	  
Populist	  attitudes:	  media	  exposure	  and	  social	  attitudes.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  media	  exposure	  we	  distinguish	  
between	  those	  who	  read	  ‘right	  wing	  populist	  newspapers’	  –	  the	  Mail,	  Express,	  Sun,	  Star	  and	  
Telegraph	  –	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  	  These	  are	  all	  newspapers	  which,	  in	  both	  their	  editorials	  and	  
news	  coverage,	  tend	  to	  be	  supportive	  of	  an	  aggressive	  UK	  foreign	  policy	  stance,	  sceptical	  about	  the	  
value	  and	  consequences	  of	  human	  rights	  legislation,	  critical	  of	  immigration	  and	  opposed	  to	  Britain’s	  
membership	  of	  the	  EU	  (Seymour-­‐Ure,	  1997;	  Wheeler,	  1997).	  	  As	  Table	  5	  shows,	  Authoritarian	  
Populism	  is	  certainly	  more	  common	  among	  those	  exposed	  to	  the	  populist	  press	  (74%	  of	  its	  readers	  
fit	  our	  categorisation	  of	  AP)	  than	  it	  is	  among	  those	  who	  not	  exposed	  (41%	  of	  non-­‐readers	  can	  be	  
described	  as	  AP).	  	  Table	  5	  also	  reports	  the	  differences	  in	  average	  scores	  on	  three	  6-­‐point	  scales	  that	  
seek	  to	  measure	  Traditional	  Social	  Values.	  	  We	  differentiate	  among	  three	  sets	  of	  traditional	  social	  
values:	  	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  respondent	  evaluates	  other	  people	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  their	  actions	  
‘showed	  love	  for	  his	  or	  her	  country’;	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  ‘children	  ought	  to	  learn	  respect	  for	  
authority’;	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  men	  and	  women	  should	  ‘play	  different	  roles	  in	  society’.	  	  We	  
hypothesise	  that	  individuals	  who	  espouse	  traditional	  values	  like	  these	  should	  be	  more	  susceptible	  to	  
the	  sort	  of	  nationalistic	  ideational	  and	  policy	  appeals	  made	  by	  Authoritarian	  Populism.	  	  These	  are	  
people	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  nostalgic	  about	  the	  past,	  who	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  society	  to	  
return	  to	  a	  (largely	  non-­‐existent)	  golden	  age	  in	  which	  traditional	  values,	  traditional	  social	  forms	  and	  
Britain’s	  traditional	  (and	  superior)	  place	  in	  the	  world	  can	  be	  restored.	  	  The	  second	  segment	  of	  Table	  
5	  shows	  that	  Authoritarian	  Populists	  exhibit	  significantly	  higher	  average	  scores,	  across	  all	  three	  sets	  
of	  traditional	  social	  values,	  than	  do	  non-­‐APs.	  	  (For	  example,	  59%	  of	  APs	  believe	  that	  men	  and	  women	  
should	  perform	  different	  social	  roles,	  compared	  with	  only	  39%	  of	  non-­‐APs	  who	  hold	  this	  belief).	  	  	  
The	  key	  point	  of	  the	  summary	  results	  presented	  in	  Tables	  4	  and	  5	  is	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  
differences	  between	  those	  people	  who	  can	  be	  described	  as	  Authoritarian	  Populists	  and	  those	  who	  
cannot,	  in	  terms	  of	  demographics,	  press	  readership	  and	  traditional	  social	  values.	  	  These	  simple	  
bivariate	  relationships	  can	  be	  taken	  further,	  however.	  	  Rather	  than	  treating	  AP	  as	  a	  simple	  
dichotomy,	  we	  can	  use	  the	  AP	  alpha	  scale	  referred	  to	  earlier	  as	  an	  interval-­‐level	  measure	  of	  each	  
individual’s	  degree	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism.	  	  Using	  the	  same	  predictor	  variables	  identified	  in	  
Tables	  4	  and	  5,	  we	  can	  specify	  and	  test	  a	  simple	  individual-­‐level	  model	  of	  AP	  as	  follows:	  
APScalei	  =	  a	  +	  Σb1-­‐9	  (Demographics)	  +	  b10	  Reads	  Populist	  Newspaper	  +	  b11	  Values	  Patriotism	  	  
+	  b12	  Children	  Respect	  Authority	  +	  b13	  Differentiated	  Gender	  Roles	  +	  εi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [1]	  
where	  is	  a	  random	  error	  term	  and	  all	  predictor	  variables	  are	  defined	  as	  in	  Tables	  4,	  and	  5.	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Table	  6	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  estimating	  [1].	  	  As	  APScalei	  is	  a	  normally	  distributed	  interval-­‐level	  
variable	  (see	  Annex	  3),	  estimation	  is	  by	  OLS.	  	  	  The	  model	  is	  reasonably	  well	  determined	  with	  an	  r2	  of	  
0.37	  –	  reasonably	  high	  for	  individual-­‐level	  attitudinal	  data.	  The	  results	  show,	  unsurprisingly,	  that	  
several	  of	  the	  demographic	  variables	  identified	  in	  Table	  4	  lose	  their	  significance	  when	  the	  effects	  of	  
other	  drivers	  are	  considered	  simultaneously.	  	  This	  conclusion	  clearly	  applies	  to	  gender,	  ethnicity,	  
public	  sector	  employment	  and	  residence	  in	  Scotland,	  all	  of	  which	  yield	  non-­‐significant	  coefficients.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  is	  influenced	  positively	  by	  age	  (b=-­‐.004)	  and	  by	  
residence	  in	  the	  West	  Midlands	  (b=.24);	  and	  negatively	  by	  education	  (b=-­‐.13),	  middle	  class	  status	  
(b=-­‐.12),	  trade	  union	  membership	  (b=-­‐.36)	  and	  residence	  in	  Wales	  (b=-­‐.23).	  	  The	  regional	  effects	  are	  
not	  easy	  to	  explain,	  though	  the	  positive	  West	  Midlands	  effect	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  outside	  
London	  (which	  is	  a	  special	  case	  in	  relation	  to	  many	  social	  and	  political	  attitudes)	  the	  West	  Midlands	  
has	  the	  largest	  ethnic	  minority	  population	  in	  the	  UK	  at	  17.3%	  (ONS,	  2012).	  The	  negative	  effect	  for	  
Wales	  could	  in	  turn	  reflect	  its	  status	  as	  the	  region	  with	  the	  smallest	  ethnic	  minority	  population	  
(4.4%).	  	  These	  demographic	  effects	  are	  perhaps	  less	  important	  than	  the	  other	  results	  reported	  in	  
Table	  6.	  	  As	  expected,	  readers	  of	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  newspapers	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
score	  highly	  on	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  (b=.50).	  	  Similarly,	  each	  of	  our	  measures	  of	  traditional	  social	  
attitudes	  strengthens	  AP	  –	  see	  the	  significant,	  positive	  coefficients	  for	  the	  Values	  Patriotism	  (b=.11),	  
Children	  Respect	  Authority	  (b=.18)	  and	  Differentiated	  Gender	  Roles	  (b=.13)	  variables	  shown	  in	  the	  
table.	  
The	  broad	  conclusion	  suggested	  by	  Table	  6	  is	  not	  that	  we	  can	  explain	  definitively	  why	  some	  people	  
are	  more	  Authoritarian	  populist	  than	  others	  but	  that	  it	  can	  be	  shown	  (a)	  that	  AP	  has	  a	  distinctive	  and	  
understandable	  demographic	  and	  (b)	  that	  it	  is	  affected	  predictably	  by	  media	  exposure	  and	  by	  
traditional	  social	  attitudes.	  	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  paper,	  we	  endeavour	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  
‘so	  what?’	  	  Why	  do	  Authoritarian	  populist	  attitudes	  matter?	  	  What	  consequences	  do	  they	  have	  for	  
British	  politics	  more	  generally?	  
	  
3.	  The	  attitudinal	  and	  behavioural	  consequences	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
We	  seek	  to	  assess	  the	  importance	  of	  AP	  attitudes	  for	  contemporary	  UK	  politics	  by	  specifying	  and	  
testing	  four	  models	  that	  use	  AP	  as	  an	  explanatory	  variable.	  	  These	  include	  models	  of	  vote	  intention,	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  democracy,	  intended	  vote	  in	  the	  planned	  UK	  referendum	  on	  EU	  membership,	  
and	  attitudes	  towards	  judicial	  power	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  As	  far	  as	  possible,	  we	  specify	  models	  that	  have	  been	  
developed	  in	  previous	  research.	  	  Our	  key	  innovation	  in	  each	  is	  to	  include	  a	  term	  for	  APScale	  as	  an	  
additional	  predictor	  variable.	  	  In	  each	  case,	  we	  show	  that	  this	  AP	  term	  adds	  explanatory	  power	  to	  
the	  specified	  model,	  suggesting	  that	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  attitudinal	  and	  behavioural	  dispositions	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  plays	  an	  important	  explanatory	  role.	  	  	  
Modelling	  Voting	  Intentions	  
One	  obvious	  puzzle	  follows	  from	  our	  estimate	  that	  roughly	  half	  the	  UK	  adult	  population	  can	  be	  
characterised	  as	  Authoritarian	  Populist:	  UKIP	  is	  clearly	  a	  populist	  party	  yet	  it	  received	  only	  15%	  	  of	  
the	  popular	  vote	  in	  the	  May	  2015	  UK	  general	  election;	  so	  how	  did	  the	  remaining	  Authoritarian	  
Populists	  cast	  their	  votes?	  	  Table	  7	  provides	  the	  simple	  answer,	  based	  on	  our	  respondents’	  voting	  
intentions	  as	  stated	  in	  April	  2015:	  over	  half	  of	  APs	  (55%)	  voted	  Conservative;	  13%	  voted	  Labour;	  10%	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were	  split	  across	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  and	  the	  nationalist	  and	  minor	  parties;	  and	  22%	  of	  APs	  
supported	  UKIP.	  	  Very	  clearly,	  therefore,	  although	  there	  is	  a	  link	  between	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
and	  UK	  voting	  patterns,	  APs	  are	  attracted	  to	  more	  than	  just	  the	  archetypal	  populist	  party,	  UKIP:	  they	  
are	  equally	  strongly	  attracted	  to	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  also,	  though	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  to	  other	  
parties	  (Goodwin	  and	  Ford,	  2014).	  	  The	  key	  issue,	  of	  course,	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  AP	  as	  a	  mind-­‐set	  has	  
an	  effect	  on	  vote	  choice	  over	  and	  above	  the	  effects	  of	  other	  known	  influences	  on	  vote.	  
There	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  approach	  to	  the	  specification	  of	  UK	  vote-­‐choice	  models,	  which	  we	  follow	  
here	  with	  minor	  modifications.	  Following	  Whiteley	  et	  al	  (2013)	  we	  estimate	  a	  multinomial	  logit	  that	  
includes	  core	  terms	  for	  valence	  calculations	  (party	  leader	  evaluations	  and	  assessments	  of	  the	  party	  
best	  able	  to	  handle	  what	  the	  respondent	  regards	  as	  the	  most	  important	  issue	  facing	  the	  country)	  
and	  ideological	  spatial	  proximities	  (the	  differences	  between	  where	  the	  individual	  locates	  her/himself	  
on	  the	  left-­‐right	  spectrum	  and	  where	  s/he	  locates	  each	  of	  the	  major	  parties),	  together	  with	  a	  
standard	  set	  of	  demographic	  controls	  (Clarke	  et	  al,	  2009;	  Whiteley	  et	  al	  2013).	  	  To	  this	  core	  model	  
we	  add	  a	  term	  for	  the	  individual’s	  position	  on	  our	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  scale.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  
limited	  number	  of	  cases	  available	  in	  our	  dataset	  and	  because	  the	  main	  challenge	  suggested	  by	  the	  
results	  in	  Table	  7	  is	  to	  assess	  how	  far	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  helps	  to	  explain	  Conservative	  and	  UKIP	  
voting,	  we	  group	  together	  all	  those	  respondents	  who	  indicated	  support	  for	  any	  of	  the	  left-­‐leaning	  
parties	  that	  stood	  in	  the	  2015	  UK	  general	  election	  –	  Labour,	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  the	  Greens,	  Plaid	  
Cymru	  and	  the	  SNP	  –	  which	  we	  use	  as	  our	  base	  category	  in	  the	  multinomial	  estimation.	  (The	  results	  
are	  substantially	  the	  same	  if	  we	  use	  only	  Labour	  as	  the	  base	  category	  –	  see	  Annex	  6).	  	  We	  exclude	  all	  
respondents	  who	  indicated	  either	  that	  they	  would	  not	  vote	  or	  didn’t	  know	  how	  they	  would	  vote,	  
together	  with	  a	  small	  number	  of	  respondents	  who	  indicated	  their	  intention	  of	  voting	  for	  other	  minor	  
parties.	  The	  model	  we	  estimate	  is:	  
Vote	  Intention	  =	  f(Conservative,	  UKIP	  and	  Labour	  Leader	  Evaluations;	  Conservatives	  Best	  
Party,	  UKIP	  Best	  party,	  Labour	  Best	  Party	  on	  Most	  Important	  Issue/not;	  Spatial	  Proximity	  
Respondent-­‐Conservatives,	  Respondent-­‐UKIP,	  Respondent-­‐Labour;	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
Scale;	  Demographic	  Controls)	  	  	   	   	   	   	   [2]	  
Table	  8	  estimates	  [2].	  	  The	  results	  are	  reassuring	  in	  that	  the	  model	  is	  well	  determined	  (pseudo-­‐	  
r2=.66)	  and	  the	  relevant	  valence	  and	  spatial	  terms	  are	  significant	  and	  correctly	  signed.	  	  In	  the	  
Conservative	  versus	  left-­‐leaning	  party	  equation	  (Segment	  A),	  the	  coefficients	  for	  Cameron’s	  ratings,	  
Conservatives	  as	  Best	  Party	  on	  Most	  Important	  Issue	  and	  Conservative-­‐Respondent	  Spatial	  Proximity	  
are	  all	  positive	  and	  highly	  significant.	  	  Similarly,	  in	  the	  UKIP	  versus	  left-­‐leaning	  party	  equation	  
(Segment	  B),	  the	  coefficients	  for	  Farage’s	  ratings,	  UKIP	  as	  Best	  Party	  and	  UKIP-­‐Respondent	  Spatial	  
Proximity	  are	  all	  positive	  and	  highly	  significant.	  	  Critically,	  for	  our	  purposes	  here,	  the	  APscale	  term	  is	  
positive	  and	  highly	  significant	  in	  both	  the	  Conservative	  (b=1.12)	  and	  UKIP	  (b=1.21)	  equations.	  	  
Translating	  these	  coefficients	  into	  changes	  in	  probabilities	  using	  CLARIFY	  indicates	  that,	  if	  we	  
increase	  the	  APscale	  score	  of	  an	  individual	  from	  its	  minimum	  to	  its	  maximum	  values	  (from	  0.4	  to	  
5.0),	  holding	  all	  other	  variables	  constant	  at	  their	  respective	  means,	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  individual	  
supporting	  the	  Conservatives	  increases	  by	  p=.61;	  the	  probability	  of	  supporting	  UKIP	  increases	  by	  
p=.19.	  	  In	  short,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  standard	  valence	  and	  spatial	  effects	  and	  controlling	  for	  standard	  
demographics,	  vote	  intention	  (in	  this	  case	  in	  the	  May	  2015	  UK	  general	  election)	  is	  powerfully	  
influenced	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  attitudes:	  support	  in	  May	  2015	  for	  UKIP	  and	  especially	  for	  the	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Conservatives	  was	  powerfully	  bolstered	  by	  the	  AP	  sentiments	  of	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  UK	  
electorate.	  
Modelling	  EU	  Referendum	  Vote	  Intentions	  
Britain	  is	  due	  to	  hold	  a	  referendum	  on	  its	  continued	  EU	  membership	  before	  the	  end	  of	  2017.	  	  In	  the	  
April	  2015	  wave	  of	  our	  survey	  we	  asked	  respondents	  how	  they	  intended	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  promised	  
referendum:	  40%	  said	  they	  would	  vote	  to	  leave,	  45%	  to	  stay	  and	  15%	  were	  undecided.	  	  Models	  of	  
referendum	  voting	  typically	  focus	  (a)	  on	  the	  cognitive	  shortcuts	  or	  heuristics	  that	  voters	  tend	  to	  use	  
in	  relatively	  unusual	  situations	  and	  (b)	  on	  how	  people	  evaluate	  Britain’s	  EU	  membership,	  whilst	  (c)	  
controlling	  for	  standard	  demographics	  (LeDuc	  2003	  and	  2005;Sanders	  et	  al,	  2015).	  	  We	  follow	  this	  
general	  approach,	  with	  two	  additions.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  heuristics,	  we	  use	  measures	  of	  party	  
identification/not	  with	  each	  the	  four	  major	  UK-­‐wide	  political	  parties	  (we	  had	  too	  few	  respondents	  in	  
Scotland	  and	  Wales	  to	  produce	  reliable	  estimates	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  identification	  with	  either	  the	  SNP	  
or	  Plaid	  Cymru)	  together	  with	  measures	  of	  respondent’s	  affect	  towards	  the	  leaders	  of	  each	  of	  the	  
four	  main	  parties	  (Cameron	  for	  the	  Conservatives;	  Miliband	  for	  Labour;	  Clegg	  for	  the	  Liberal	  
Democrats	  and	  Farage	  for	  UKIP).	  	  Given	  the	  positions	  on	  the	  EU	  taken	  by	  the	  party	  leaderships	  in	  the	  
2015	  general	  election	  (the	  Conservative,	  Labour	  and	  Liberal	  Democrat	  leaderships	  were	  all	  pro-­‐EU;	  
the	  UKIP	  leadership	  was	  anti-­‐EU),	  we	  expect	  support	  for	  Britain’s	  staying	  in	  the	  EU	  to	  be	  positively	  
associated	  with	  Conservative,	  Labour	  and	  Lib-­‐Dem	  identifications	  and	  with	  the	  affect	  measure	  for	  
Cameron,	  Miliband	  and	  Clegg;	  in	  contrast,	  we	  expect	  negative	  effects	  for	  UKIP	  identification	  and	  
affect	  towards	  Farage.	  
We	  assess	  evaluations	  of	  EU	  membership	  through	  responses	  to	  three	  questions	  about	  the	  
consequences	  of	  Britain’s	  membership:	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  European	  exporters	  benefit	  
disproportionately	  more	  than	  UK	  exporters	  from	  Britain’s	  membership;	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
respondents	  believe	  EU	  politicians	  and	  bureaucrats	  are	  paid	  significantly	  more	  than	  their	  UK	  
counterparts;	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  believe	  that	  the	  UK	  is	  obliged	  to	  contribute	  
disproportionately	  too	  much	  to	  the	  annual	  EU	  budget.	  In	  addition,	  we	  also	  include	  terms	  for	  
Readership	  of	  Eurosceptic	  Newspapers/not	  (with	  an	  obvious	  expectation	  that	  exposure	  to	  such	  
newspapers	  will	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	  to	  Leave)	  and	  for	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  (with	  the	  
expectation	  that	  such	  attitudes,	  since	  they	  imply	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  liberal	  internationalism	  
associated	  with	  the	  European	  project,	  will	  also	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  voting	  to	  Leave).2	  
Our	  model	  of	  EU	  referendum	  voting	  is:	  
	   Vote	  (Stay/DK/Leave)	  =	  a	  +	  Σb1-­‐4	  Party	  Identifications	  +	  Σb5-­‐8	  Party	  Leader	  Affect	  Scores	  +	  	  
Σb9-­‐11	  Evaluations	  of	  EU	  +	  b12	  Reads	  Eurosceptic	  Newspaper	  +	  b13	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
Scale	  +	  Σb14-­‐22	  (Demographics)	  +	  εi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [3]	  
Table	  9	  estimates	  [3]	  using	  ordered	  logit.	  	  The	  model	  is	  well	  determined	  (pseudo	  r2	  =.41)	  and	  the	  
results	  are	  broadly	  consistent	  with	  theoretical	  expectations.	  	  Of	  the	  party	  identification	  terms,	  only	  
Conservative	  identification	  is	  close	  to	  significance	  (with	  a	  correctly	  signed	  coefficient,	  b=.95).	  	  
However,	  the	  leader	  affect	  variables	  produce	  more	  significant	  results:	  the	  terms	  for	  Cameron	  (b=.13)	  
and	  Miliband	  (b=.08)	  are	  both	  positive	  and	  (nearly)	  significant,	  while	  the	  term	  for	  Farage	  (b=-­‐.17)	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  We	  define	  Eurosceptic	  papers	  as	  the	  Mail,	  Express,	  Sun,	  Star	  and	  Telegraph.	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significant	  and	  negative.	  	  As	  expected,	  exposure	  to	  the	  Eurosceptic	  press	  (b=-­‐.42)	  increases	  the	  
probability	  of	  voting	  to	  Leave.	  The	  pattern	  of	  coefficients	  on	  the	  demographic	  variables	  is	  broadly	  in	  
line	  with	  previous	  findings,	  indicating	  that	  support	  the	  UK’s	  continued	  membership	  is	  significantly	  
more	  likely	  among	  men	  (b=.04),	  the	  middle	  class	  (b=.82)	  and	  in	  Scotland	  (b=.87).	  	  For	  our	  purposes	  
here,	  however,	  the	  key	  coefficient	  is	  the	  b=-­‐2.03	  for	  the	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  scale	  variable.	  	  This	  
translates	  into	  a	  p=.97	  increase	  in	  voting	  to	  Leave	  the	  EU	  if	  we	  increase	  APscale	  from	  its	  minimum	  to	  
its	  maximum	  value,	  holding	  all	  other	  variables	  constant	  at	  their	  respective	  means.	  	  Authoritarian	  
Populism,	  in	  short,	  is	  a	  hugely	  important	  driver	  of	  the	  UK	  electorate’s	  preferences	  with	  regard	  to	  
Britain’s	  leaving	  or	  staying	  in	  the	  EU.	  
Modelling	  Dissatisfaction	  with	  Democracy	  
As	  with	  models	  of	  vote	  choice,	  there	  is	  a	  well-­‐established	  tradition	  of	  modelling	  (dis)satisfaction	  with	  
democracy	  (Bowler	  and	  Donovan,	  2002;	  Clarke	  et	  al,	  2013;	  Sanders	  et	  al,	  2014).	  	  The	  specification	  
that	  we	  employ	  here	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  14-­‐item	  battery	  of	  survey	  questions	  that	  operationalizes	  the	  
two	  key	  factors	  that	  underpin	  democracy	  satisfaction:	  internal	  efficacy	  (the	  individual’s	  sense	  that	  
her/his	  actions	  can	  affect	  political	  outcomes);	  and	  external	  efficacy	  (the	  sense	  that	  established	  
political	  institutions	  respond	  effectively	  to	  citizens’	  concerns).	  	  Generally,	  external	  efficacy	  is	  found	  
to	  correlate	  negatively	  with	  democracy	  satisfaction:	  the	  less	  confidence	  an	  individual	  has	  in	  national	  
leaders	  and	  institutions,	  the	  more	  likely	  s/he	  is	  to	  be	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  
democratic	  process.	  	  Internal	  efficacy,	  in	  contrast	  can	  be	  either	  positively	  or	  negatively	  related	  to	  (or	  
even	  unrelated	  to)	  democracy	  dissatisfaction	  since	  both	  supporters	  and	  critics	  of	  the	  existing	  system	  
can	  in	  principle	  believe	  that	  their	  actions	  are	  consequential	  for	  the	  democratic	  process	  (Craig	  and	  
Maggiotto,	  1982;	  Niemi,	  Craig	  and	  Mattei,	  1991).	  The	  exploratory	  factor	  analysis	  reported	  in	  Annex	  
11	  shows	  that	  the	  measures	  in	  the	  14-­‐item	  survey	  battery	  load	  clearly	  onto	  two	  factors,	  
corresponding	  to	  internal	  and	  external	  efficacy.	  	  We	  use	  simple	  alpha	  scaling	  to	  produce	  composite	  
internal	  and	  external	  efficacy	  measures.3	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  two	  predictors,	  our	  specification	  also	  includes	  a	  term	  for	  economic	  optimism	  
(previous	  research	  has	  established	  that	  optimists	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  satisfied	  with	  the	  democratic	  
status	  quo	  that	  has	  engendered	  their	  optimism	  in	  the	  first	  place)	  and	  terms	  for	  standard	  
demographics.	  	  Critically,	  we	  also	  include	  the	  same	  APScale	  variable	  incorporated	  into	  our	  vote	  
intention	  model	  above:	  Authoritarian	  Populists	  are	  disaffected	  with	  the	  dominant	  liberal	  political	  
establishment	  –	  for	  this	  reason	  alone,	  we	  would	  expect	  our	  APscale	  measure,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  to	  be	  
positively	  associated	  with	  democracy	  dissatisfaction.	  Treating	  Democracy	  Dissatisfaction/Not	  as	  a	  
binary	  variable,	  our	  model	  is:	  	  
Democracy	  Dissatisfaction/Not	  =	  a	  +	  Σb1-­‐8	  (Demographics)	  +	  b9	  Internal	  Efficacy	  +	  b10	  
External	  Efficacy	  +	  b11	  Personal	  Economic	  Expectations	  +	  b12	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	  +	  εi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[4]	  
Table	  10	  provides	  logit	  estimates	  of	  [4].	  	  As	  expected,	  external	  efficacy	  (b=-­‐1.36)	  and	  economic	  
expectations	  (b=-­‐.47)	  both	  exert	  significant	  and	  strong	  negative	  effects	  on	  dissatisfaction.	  	  Internal	  
efficacy	  (for	  which	  we	  had	  no	  theoretical	  expectation)	  has	  a	  significant	  positive	  effect	  (b=.40).	  	  The	  
demographic	  controls	  are	  all	  non-­‐significant.	  Critically,	  the	  APScale	  effect	  is	  significant	  and	  positive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  α	  values	  for	  each	  scale	  are	  both	  well	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  α	  >.7	  threshold	  normally	  employed.	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(b=.32),	  indicating	  that	  over	  and	  above	  the	  effects	  of	  efficacy	  and	  economic	  perceptions,	  
Authoritarian	  Populist	  attitudes	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  UK	  citizens’	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  
democratic	  process.	  	  Increasing	  APscale	  from	  its	  minimum	  to	  its	  maximum	  values	  whilst	  holding	  all	  
other	  variables	  constant	  at	  their	  respective	  means	  increases	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  dissatisfied	  with	  
democracy	  by	  p=.33.	  
Modelling	  perceptions	  of	  over-­‐weaning	  judicial	  influence	  
The	  results	  we	  present	  in	  Table	  10	  show	  that	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  has	  a	  powerful	  influence	  on	  a	  
conventional	  measure	  of	  democracy	  (dis)satisfaction.	  There	  is	  a	  further	  aspect	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  
democracy,	  however,	  that	  is	  probably	  not	  picked	  up	  by	  this	  conventional	  measure.	  	  There	  is	  
evidence	  that	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  UK	  electorate	  believes,	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  that	  the	  
judicial	  branch	  has	  accreted	  rather	  too	  much	  influence	  to	  itself	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  We	  asked	  our	  
respondents	  how	  far	  they	  agreed	  or	  disagreed	  with	  the	  statement	  that	  ‘Decisions	  made	  by	  judges	  
have	  more	  influence	  on	  our	  daily	  lives	  than	  changes	  in	  the	  laws	  passed	  by	  Parliament’.	  	  Although	  
44%	  of	  respondents	  took	  no	  view,	  only	  18%	  disagreed	  with	  the	  statement	  and	  fully	  38%	  agreed	  with	  
it,	  clearly	  indicating	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  over-­‐weaning	  Judicial	  Influence	  has	  resonance	  with	  a	  substantial	  
minority	  of	  UK	  voters.	  	  A	  simple	  correlation	  between	  our	  measures	  of	  Democracy	  Satisfaction	  and	  
Judicial	  Influence	  yields	  r=.03.	  	  This,	  in	  turn,	  suggests	  that	  our	  ‘too	  much	  Judicial	  Influence’	  measure	  
is	  distinct	  from	  conventional	  democracy	  (dis)satisfaction.	  	  Indeed,	  we	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  relatively	  
widespread	  sense	  of	  over-­‐weaning	  judicial	  influence,	  which	  is	  independent	  of	  conventional	  
measures	  of	  democracy	  dissatisfaction,	  is	  something	  that	  very	  much	  requires	  explanation.	  	  
We	  hypothesise	  that	  there	  are	  two	  key	  sources	  of	  the	  perception	  that	  judges	  now	  exert	  too	  much	  
influence	  on	  people’s	  everyday	  lives.	  	  The	  first	  relates	  simply	  to	  general	  perceptions	  of	  courts,	  and	  in	  
particular	  to	  perceptions	  of	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court.	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  created	  in	  2009,	  taking	  
over	  the	  high-­‐level	  judicial	  appeal	  functions	  of	  the	  ‘Law	  Lords’.	  	  The	  second,	  third	  and	  fourth	  waves	  
of	  our	  panel	  survey,	  conducted	  in	  2012/2013,	  included	  a	  battery	  of	  nine	  questions	  taken	  directly	  
from	  surveys	  investigating	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  other	  countries.	  Scaling	  analysis	  
of	  these	  items	  in	  our	  survey	  showed	  that	  they	  reproduced	  exactly	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  uni-­‐dimensional	  
pro/anti	  Supreme	  Court	  scale	  that	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  other	  countries	  (Gibson	  and	  Caldeira,	  2009).	  	  
We	  use	  this	  scale	  to	  test	  the	  simple	  hypothesis	  that	  individuals	  who	  feel	  positively	  towards	  the	  UK	  
Supreme	  Court	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  think	  that	  judges	  have	  too	  much	  influence	  on	  people’s	  everyday	  
lives	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  	  Our	  second	  hypothesis	  relates	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  on	  attitudes	  
towards	  judges.	  	  Authoritarian	  Populists,	  it	  will	  be	  recalled,	  are	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  
agenda.	  	  Since	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act	  1998,	  the	  UK	  judiciary	  has	  been	  obliged	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  UK	  
legislation	  is	  interpreted	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  
Human	  Rights.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  has	  meant	  that	  the	  more	  liberal	  rulings	  made	  by	  the	  UK’s	  highest	  courts	  
over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  or	  so	  have	  conflicted	  with	  the	  deep	  seated	  anti-­‐human	  rights	  sentiments	  
of	  Authoritarian	  Populists.	  	  We	  hypothesise	  in	  these	  circumstances	  that	  the	  higher	  an	  individual’s	  
score	  on	  our	  APscale	  measure,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  s/he	  will	  consider	  that	  judges	  exert	  too	  much	  
influence	  on	  everyday	  life	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  	  
Incorporating	  these	  two	  hypotheses,	  with	  the	  same	  demographic	  controls	  as	  in	  [2]-­‐[4],	  our	  model	  of	  
over-­‐weaning	  judicial	  influence	  is:	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Too	  much	  Judge	  Influence/Not	  =	  a	  +	  b1	  Pro	  Supreme	  Court	  +	  b2	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	  
+	  Σb3-­‐10	  (Demographics)	  +	  εi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   [5]	  
Table	  11	  reports	  the	  consequences	  of	  estimating	  [5]	  using	  binomial	  logit.	  The	  model	  is	  not	  
particularly	  well	  determined	  (pseudo	  R2	  is	  only	  .10)	  but	  the	  two	  main	  hypothesised	  effects	  produce	  
significant,	  correctly	  signed	  coefficients.	  	  As	  predicted,	  the	  Pro	  Supreme	  Court	  scale	  exerts	  a	  
significant	  negative	  effect	  (b=-­‐.45)	  while	  the	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  scale	  effect	  is	  significant	  and	  
positive	  (b=.65).	  	  Increasing	  APscale	  from	  its	  minimum	  to	  its	  maximum	  values	  whilst	  holding	  all	  other	  
variables	  constant	  at	  their	  respective	  means	  increases	  the	  probability	  of	  believing	  that	  judges	  exert	  
too	  much	  influence	  on	  UK	  laws	  by	  p=.61.	  
	  
Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  
This	  paper	  has	  had	  three	  core	  objectives:	  (1)	  to	  show	  that	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  is	  a	  distinct	  mind-­‐
set	  among	  the	  UK	  voting-­‐age	  population,	  even	  though	  individuals	  vary	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  
embrace	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  attitudes;	  (2)	  to	  explore	  the	  individual-­‐level	  sources	  of	  AP	  attitudes;	  
and	  (3)	  to	  assess	  the	  possible	  consequences	  of	  AP	  attitudes	  in	  terms	  of	  UK	  voting	  preferences,	  EU	  
Referendum	  vote	  intention,	  democracy	  dissatisfaction	  and	  perceptions	  of	  judicial	  influence.	  
The	  starting	  point	  of	  our	  analysis	  was	  the	  conjecture	  that	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  represents	  a	  
constellation	  of	  mass	  attitudes	  across	  five	  connected	  domains	  that	  form	  a	  coherent,	  single	  
dimension	  of	  political	  attitudes.	  	  The	  five	  domains	  focused	  on	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  EU,	  towards	  
human	  rights,	  towards	  immigration,	  towards	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  providing	  public	  services,	  and	  
about	  the	  way	  the	  UK	  should	  conduct	  itself	  in	  its	  relations	  with	  other	  countries.	  	  We	  used	  
exploratory	  factor	  analysis	  and	  simple	  scale	  analysis,	  employing	  (10-­‐wave)	  panel	  data	  from	  a	  
representative	  sample	  of	  the	  British	  electorate,	  to	  show	  that	  these	  five	  domains	  could	  indeed	  by	  
reduced	  to	  a	  single,	  measured	  dimension.	  
The	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  analysis	  used	  cluster	  analysis	  in	  order	  to	  estimate	  the	  approximate	  size	  of	  
the	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  population	  in	  the	  UK.	  This	  is	  clearly	  not	  the	  only	  methodology	  that	  could	  
be	  deployed	  in	  this	  context,	  but	  it	  has	  the	  considerable	  merit	  of	  simplicity	  and	  clarity.	  	  We	  showed	  
that	  a	  simple	  2-­‐cluster	  solution	  (in	  which	  the	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  group	  represented	  just	  over	  half	  
of	  the	  sample)	  underpinned	  more	  elaborated	  and	  complex	  3-­‐,	  4-­‐	  and	  5-­‐cluster	  solutions.	  	  We	  take	  
this	  to	  indicate	  that	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  is	  a	  major	  mind-­‐set	  among	  contemporary	  British	  voters	  
that	  needs	  to	  be	  analysed	  systematically	  in	  order	  properly	  to	  be	  understood.	  	  	  
The	  third	  stage	  of	  our	  analysis	  explored	  the	  individual-­‐level	  sources	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  
attitudes	  using	  our	  interval-­‐level	  APScale	  measure	  as	  a	  dependent	  variable.	  	  Our	  results	  showed	  that	  
AP	  attitudes	  are	  significantly	  more	  prevalent	  among	  those	  who	  read	  right-­‐wing	  newspapers	  and	  who	  
hold	  traditional	  social	  values	  with	  regard	  to	  patriotism,	  gender	  roles,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  children	  to	  
respect	  authority.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  clear	  demographic	  to	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  sentiment:	  it	  is	  lower	  
among	  graduates,	  the	  middle	  class	  and	  trade	  unionists;	  it	  is	  higher	  among	  the	  old.	  	  Geographically,	  
there	  are	  variations	  in	  average	  APscale	  scores	  across	  the	  UK,	  but	  the	  only	  spatial	  effects	  that	  retain	  
their	  significance	  in	  a	  multivariate	  model	  show	  that	  AP	  is	  significantly	  higher	  in	  the	  West	  Midlands	  
and	  lower	  in	  Wales.	  
13	  
	  
The	  final	  stage	  of	  our	  analysis	  involved	  assessing	  the	  possible	  consequences	  of	  Authoritarian	  
Populism	  in	  two	  behavioural	  areas	  (general	  election	  voting	  and	  EU	  referendum	  voting)	  and	  two	  
further	  attitudinal	  domains	  (dissatisfaction	  with	  democracy	  and	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  influence	  of	  
judges).	  	  	  In	  each	  of	  these	  areas,	  we	  attempted	  to	  specify	  testable	  models,	  based	  where	  possible	  on	  
empirical	  findings	  from	  previous	  studies,	  which	  allowed	  to	  us	  to	  assess	  whether	  or	  not	  our	  APscale	  
measure	  had	  a	  clear	  statistical	  effect	  on	  the	  selected	  dependent	  variable,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  effects	  
of	  other	  known	  predictors.	  	  The	  results	  provided	  strong	  a	  priori	  evidence	  for	  the	  explanatory	  power	  
of	  Authoritarian	  Populism.	  	  In	  each	  of	  the	  models	  tested,	  we	  found	  strong	  evidence	  for	  an	  
‘Authoritarian	  Populism	  effect’.	  	  Over	  and	  above	  standard	  valence	  and	  spatial	  considerations,	  AP	  
offers	  a	  powerful	  explanatory	  account	  of	  UKIP	  and	  especially	  Conservative	  voting	  intention	  in	  the	  
2015	  UK	  general	  election.	  	  	  Over	  and	  above	  standard	  heuristics	  (party	  identifications	  and	  leader	  
assessments)	  and	  economic	  evaluations	  of	  the	  EU,	  AP	  has	  a	  huge	  effect	  on	  the	  decision	  whether	  not	  
to	  vote	  for	  Britain	  to	  Leave	  or	  to	  Stay	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  Over	  and	  above	  the	  impact	  of	  internal	  and	  external	  
efficacy	  and	  of	  economic	  confidence,	  AP	  has	  a	  significant	  and	  positive	  (if	  modest)	  effect	  on	  people’s	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  democracy.	  	  Finally,	  over	  and	  above	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  AP	  
has	  a	  significant	  and	  large	  effect	  on	  mass	  attitudes	  towards	  over-­‐weaning	  judicial	  influence.	  	  All	  of	  
these	  effects	  are	  significant	  and	  robust	  to	  variations	  in	  model	  specification	  that	  we	  have	  not	  
reported	  here.	  	  	  
Students	  of	  democratic	  politics	  have	  discussed	  the	  rise	  of	  populism	  and	  of	  authoritarian	  populism	  in	  
Europe	  for	  over	  30	  years.	  	  Here	  we	  have	  offered	  what	  we	  believe	  is	  the	  first	  systematic	  empirical	  
analysis	  of	  its	  prevalence	  as	  a	  mind-­‐set	  among	  the	  UK	  mass	  public,	  together	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	  
its	  origins	  and	  an	  assessment	  of	  its	  importance	  for	  understanding	  several	  different	  developments	  in	  
UK	  mass	  politics.	  It	  would	  be	  fascinating	  to	  explore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  similar	  attitude	  patterns,	  and	  
potential	  consequences,	  are	  evident	  in	  other	  advanced	  democracies.	  	  	  In	  any	  event,	  both	  political	  
parties	  and	  political	  observers	  would	  do	  well	  to	  watch	  the	  evolution	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  
attitudes	  as	  they	  wrestle	  with	  the	  assorted	  problems	  of	  immigration,	  Britain’s	  EU	  referendum	  
campaign,	  and	  the	  challenges	  to	  human	  rights	  laws	  and	  conventions	  arising	  from	  concerns	  about	  
fundamentalist	  terrorism.	  	  We	  may	  not	  like	  Authoritarian	  Populists	  but	  they	  are	  here,	  now,	  in	  large	  
numbers	  –	  far	  more	  numerous	  than	  the	  four	  million	  voters	  who	  supported	  UKIP	  in	  2015.	  	  And,	  as	  we	  
have	  shown,	  their	  views	  matter	  and	  have	  consequences.	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Table	  1:	  Measures	  of	  the	  Five	  Components	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
	  
	   Mean	   Range	   N	  
Ideological	  sympathy	  for	  market	  and	  rolling	  back	  of	  the	  state	   5.11	   0-­‐10	   1236	  
Britain	  Strong	  and	  Tough	  Foreign	  Policy	   0.33	   0-­‐1	   2687	  
Negative	  Emotional	  Response	  to	  Immigration	   1.37	   0-­‐4	   2687	  
Critical	  of	  Human	  Rights	   3.25	   1-­‐5	   2687	  
Disapproval	  of	  European	  Union	   3.04	   1-­‐5	   2687	  
For	  precise	  measures	  and	  question	  wordings,	  see	  Annex	  1	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Exploratory	  Factor	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Five	  Components	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  
	  
	   Factor	  1	   Uniqueness	  
Left-­‐Right	  Self	  Placement	   0.46	   0.79	  
Britain	  Strong	  and	  Tough	  Foreign	  Policy	   0.72	   0.48	  
Negative	  Emotional	  Response	  to	  Immigration	   0.70	   0.51	  
Critical	  of	  Human	  Rights	   0.67	   0.55	  
Disapproval	  of	  European	  Union	   0.57	   0.67	  
Factor	  1	  eigenvalue=2.00;	  Factor	  2	  eigenvalue=-­‐.05;	  chisq	  (10)=1539.84;	  p=.0000;	  N=1236.	  Alpha	  
scale	  test	  on	  the	  same	  variables	  produces	  α=.74.	  For	  equivalent	  analyses	  from	  1983	  and	  1997,	  see	  
Annex	  2.	  
	  























2-­‐clusters	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cluster	  A1	   641	  (52%)	   6.65	   0.43	   2.09	   3.82	   3.81	  
Cluster	  A2	   595	  (48%)	   3.44	   0.16	   0.74	   2.55	   2.34	  
3-­‐clusters	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cluster	  B1	   471	  (38%)	   6.09	   0.41	   1.79	   3.76	   3.75	  
Cluster	  B2	   170	  (14%)	   8.22	   0.46	   2.90	   4.06	   4.01	  
Cluster	  B3	   595	  (48%)	   3.44	   0.16	   0.74	   2.55	   2.34	  
4-­‐clusters	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cluster	  C1	   471	  (38%)	   6.09	   0.41	   1.79	   3.76	   3.75	  
Cluster	  C2	   170	  (14%)	   8.22	   0.46	   2.90	   4.06	   4.01	  
Cluster	  C3	   472	  (38%)	   3.99	   0.18	   0.84	   2.69	   2.40	  
Cluster	  C4	   123	  (10%)	   3.67	   0.10	   0.36	   1.99	   2.09	  
5-­‐clusters	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cluster	  D1	   471	  (38%)	   6.09	   0.41	   1.79	   3.76	   3.75	  
Cluster	  D2	   170	  (14%)	   8.22	   0.46	   2.90	   4.06	   4.01	  
Cluster	  D3	   427	  (35%)	   4.08	   0.16	   0.66	   2.51	   2.18	  
Cluster	  D4	   45	  (4%)	   3.11	   0.42	   2.60	   4.22	   4.51	  
Cluster	  D5	   123	  (10%)	   3.67	   0.10	   0.36	   1.99	   2.09	  
Cell	  entries,	  except	  where	  specified,	  are	  mean	  scores	  within	  the	  relevant	  cluster.	  Total	  N=1236;	  




Table	  4:	  The	  Demographic	  Profile	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populists	  in	  Britaina	  
	  
	   Percentage	  
Authoritarian	  
Populist	  
	   Percentage	  
Authoritarian	  
Populist	  
All	   52	   	   	  
Male	   51	   Trade	  Unionist	   28	  
Female	   53	   Not	  Trade	  Unionist	   55	  
Aged	  over	  65	   64	   	   	  
Aged	  51-­‐65	   55	   North	  East	   57	  
Aged	  31-­‐50	   45	   North	  West	   51	  
Aged	  18-­‐30	   39	   Yorkshire	  and	  Humber	   56	  
White	   53	   East	  Midlands	   54	  
Ethnic	  Minority	   40	   West	  Midlands	   60	  
Non	  Graduate	   57	   East	  of	  England	   55	  
Graduate	   45	   London	   51	  
Middle	  Classb	   46	   South	  East	   54	  
Working	  Class	   55	   South	  West	   48	  
Public	  Sector	   48	   Wales	   35	  
Not	  Public	  Sector	   54	   Scotland	   46	  
a	  Authoritarian	  Populists	  defined	  as	  Cluster	  A1	  in	  Table	  3.	  b	  Professional/Managerial.	  N=1236;	  
weighted	  by	  Weight_wave10.	  	  
	  
Table	  5:	  Bivariate	  Relationships	  between	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  and	  its	  Non	  Demographic	  
Correlates	  
	  




Traditional	  Social	  Values	   	   	  
	  	  Values	  Patriotism	  





	  	  Believes	  children	  should	  respect	  authority	  





	  	  Believes	  in	  differentiated	  gender	  roles	  	  





Populist	  Newspaper	  Readership	   	   	  
	  	  Reads	  populist	  newspaper	  



















Table	  6:	  OLS	  Model	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  Attitudes	  in	  Britain	  
	  
Predictor	  Variable	   Coefficient	  
Traditional	  Social	  Values	   	  
	  	  Values	  Patriotism	   .11**	  
	  	  Believes	  children	  should	  respect	  authority	   .18**	  
	  	  Believes	  in	  differentiated	  gender	  roles	  	   .13**	  
Reads	  Populist	  Newspaper/not	   .50**	  
Male/not	   .03	  
Age	   .00*	  
White/not	   .01	  
Graduate/not	   -­‐.13*	  
Middle	  Class/not	   -­‐.12*	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.05	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   -­‐.36**	  
West	  Midlands	   .24**	  
Scotland	   -­‐.05	  
Wales	   -­‐.23*	  
Constant	   .63**	  
Adjusted	  R2	   .37	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   1059	  
Dependent	  variable	  is	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  scale.	  	  For	  full	  model	  details,	  see	  Annex	  4.	  
In	  this	  and	  subsequent	  tables,	  *	  denotes	  p<=.05;	  **p<=.01.	  
	  
	  
Table	  7:	  Bivariate	  Relationship	  between	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  and	  Vote	  Intention,	  April	  2015	  





Conservative	   11	   55	   35	  
Labour	   58	   13	   34	  
UKIP	   6	   22	   14	  
Liberal	  Democrat	   9	   5	   7	  
Other	   15	   6	   11	  
Column	  percentages	  reported.	  	  N=1039;	  weighted	  by	  Weight_wave10	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Table	  8:	  Multinomial	  Logit	  Model	  of	  Vote	  Intention	  
	  
	   A:	  Conservative	  Vote	  
Intention	  versus	  Base	  
Category	  
B:	  UKIP	  Vote	  
Intention	  versus	  Base	  
Category	  
	   Coefficient	   Coefficient	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .51**	   -­‐.03	  
Liking	  of	  Miliband	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.14	   -­‐.24**	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.02	   .46**	  
Conservatives	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   1.00**	   .13	  
Labour	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   -­‐.94	   -­‐.91	  
UKIP	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   .35	   .86	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Conservatives	   .28**	   -­‐.17	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Labour	   -­‐.40**	   -­‐.25*	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  UKIP	   -­‐.02	   .32**	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   1.12**	   1.21**	  
Male/not	   -­‐.45	   .52	  
Age	   -­‐.02	   0.02	  
White/not	   2.11*	   1.05	  
Graduate/not	   .27	   1.04*	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .47	   -­‐.29	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.88*	   -­‐.10	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   -­‐.06	   -­‐.11	  
Scotland	   -­‐2.93**	   -­‐2.35**	  
Constant	   -­‐4.68**	   -­‐5.83**	  
Pseudo	  R2	   .66	   	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   779	   	  
Base	  Category	  is	  Vote	  Intention	  for	  Labour,	  Liberal	  Democrat,	  Green,	  SNP	  or	  Plaid	  Cymru;	  measured	  
at	  wave	  10.	  	  Most	  Important	  Problem	  (MIP)	  and	  leader	  affect	  terms	  measured	  at	  wave	  7.	  	  Proximity	  
terms	  measured	  at	  waves	  1,	  2	  and	  4	  (self-­‐placement)	  and	  wave	  6	  (party	  positions).	  For	  full	  details,	  
see	  Annex	  5.	  
	  
	   	  
20	  
	  
Table	  9:	  Ordered	  Logit	  Model	  of	  EU	  Referendum	  Vote	  Intention	  
	  
	   Coefficient	  
Conservative	  party	  identification/not	   .95*	  
Labour	  party	  identification/not	   .25	  
UKIP	  identification/not	   .62	  
Liberal	  Democrat	  party	  identification/not	   .40	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .13*	  
Liking	  of	  Miliband	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .08	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.17**	  
Liking	  of	  Clegg	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .06	  
EU	  exports	  much	  more	  to	  UK	  than	  we	  export	  to	  them	   -­‐.33**	  
EU	  bureaucrats	  and	  politicians	  paid	  more	  than	  in	  UK	   -­‐.21	  
UK	  pays	  disproportionately	  large	  contribution	  to	  EU	  budget	   -­‐.21	  
Reads	  Eurosceptic	  Press/not	   .42	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   -­‐2.03**	  
Male/not	   .41	  
Age	   -­‐.01	  
White/not	   .44	  
Graduate/not	   -­‐.45	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .82**	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.09	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   -­‐.31	  
Scotland	   .87*	  
Cut	  1	   -­‐7.64	  
Cut	  2	   -­‐6.73	  
Pseudo	  R2	   .41	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   779	  
Dependent	  variable	  is	  1=Vote	  to	  Leave	  EU;	  2=Undecided;	  3=Vote	  to	  Stay	  in	  EU.	  	  For	  full	  model	  
details,	  see	  Annex	  8.	  
	  





Table	  10:	  Logit	  Model	  of	  Dissatisfaction	  with	  Democracy	  
	  
	   Coefficient	  
Internal	  Political	  Efficacy	   .40**	  
External	  Political	  Efficacy	   -­‐1.36**	  
Personal	  Economic	  Expectations	   -­‐.47**	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   .32**	  
Male/not	   .11	  
Age	   -­‐.00	  
White/not	   .02	  
Graduate/not	   -­‐.20	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .19	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.06	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   .19	  
Scotland	   -­‐.39	  
Constant	   .13	  
Pseudo	  R2	   .17	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   770	  
Dependent	  variable	  is	  Dissatisfied	  with	  Democracy=1;	  not=0;	  measured	  at	  wave	  10.	  For	  full	  model	  
details,	  see	  Annex	  9.	  
	  
	  
Table	  11:	  Logit	  Model	  of	  Over-­‐weaning	  Judicial	  Influence	  
	  
	   Coefficient	  
Pro	  Supreme	  Court	  Scale	   -­‐.45*	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   .65**	  
Male/not	   .47**	  
Age	   .02**	  
White/not	   -­‐.23	  
Graduate/not	   .22	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .14	  
Public	  Sector/not	   .13	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   .17	  
Scotland	   .11	  
Constant	   -­‐2.43**	  
Pseudo	  R2	   .10	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   1057	  
Dependent	  variable	  is	  Too	  Much	  Judicial	  Influence=1;	  not=0;	  measured	  at	  wave	  10.	  For	  full	  model	  
details,	  see	  Annex	  10.	  
	   	  
22	  
	  
Annex	  1:	  Question	  Wordings	  for	  Component	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  Measures	  
	  
Ideological	  sympathy	  for	  market	  and	  rolling	  back	  of	  the	  state.	  Respondent’s	  self-­‐placement	  on	  0-­‐10	  
Left-­‐Right	  scale.	  The	  measure	  is	  an	  average	  of	  the	  self-­‐placements	  made	  by	  each	  respondent	  across	  
waves	  1,	  2	  and	  4	  of	  the	  survey.	  	  Other	  components	  all	  measured	  at	  Wave	  10.	  
	  
Britain	  Strong	  and	  Tough	  Foreign	  Policy.	  Question:	  From	  the	  list	  of	  foreign	  policy	  priorities,	  please	  
select	  the	  one	  you	  think	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  should	  pursue	  in	  the	  21st	  Century	  (figures	  in	  
parentheses	  indicate	  the	  percentage	  of	  respondents	  choosing	  each	  category):	  Helping	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
world	  by	  providing	  foreign	  aid	  and	  protecting	  human	  rights	  (12%);	  Solving	  international	  problems	  by	  
working	  with	  other	  nations	  and	  working	  through	  international	  organizations	  (44%);	  Protecting	  British	  
interests	  by	  being	  strong	  and	  tough	  with	  other	  nations	  and	  maintaining	  a	  powerful	  military	  (33%);	  
Avoiding	  involvement	  with	  other	  nations	  by	  simply	  minding	  our	  own	  business	  in	  international	  affairs	  
(12%).	  The	  measure	  used	  is	  a	  dummy	  where	  1=chose	  the	  ‘strong	  and	  tough’	  option,	  0=not.	  	  
	  
Negative	  Emotional	  Response	  to	  Immigration.	  	  Question:	  Please	  indicate	  which	  of	  the	  following	  
emotions	  you	  feel	  towards	  immigrants:	  Angry,	  Happy,	  Disgusted,	  Hopeful,	  Uneasy,	  Confident,	  Afraid,	  
and	  Proud.	  	  The	  measure	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  negative	  emotions	  (angry,	  disgusted,	  uneasy,	  afraid)	  specified	  
by	  the	  respondent.	  	  
	  
Critical	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  Statement:	  	  People	  who	  talk	  about	  protecting	  human	  rights	  are	  mainly	  
interested	  in	  protecting	  the	  rights	  of	  criminals,	  not	  those	  of	  their	  victims.	  Strongly	  agree	  (19%);	  
Agree	  (26%);	  Neither	  agree	  nor	  disagree	  (22%);	  Disagree	  (16%);	  Strongly	  disagree	  (11%).	  
	  
Disapproval	  of	  European	  Union.	  Question:	  Overall	  do	  you	  strongly	  approve,	  approve,	  disapprove	  or	  
strongly	  disapprove	  of	  the	  European	  Union?	  	  Strongly	  approve	  (13%);	  Approve	  (32%);	  Neither/Don’t	  
Know	  (15%);	  Disapprove	  (22%);	  Strongly	  disapprove	  (19%).	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Annex	  2:	  Exploratory	  Factor	  Analyses	  of	  Comparable	  Components	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  1983	  
and	  1997	  
	  
The	  same	  set	  of	  signature	  variables	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  that	  were	  included	  in	  our	  survey	  were	  
not	  incorporated	  into	  earlier	  surveys,	  so	  direct	  testing	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  our	  findings	  to	  earlier	  
periods	  is	  not	  possible.	  	  However,	  loosely	  comparable	  questions	  to	  those	  in	  our	  study	  were	  asked	  in	  
the	  1983	  and	  1997	  British	  Election	  Study	  surveys.	  	  Here	  we	  report	  the	  results	  of	  conducting	  
exploratory	  factor	  analyses	  involving	  variables	  that	  seek	  to	  capture	  the	  same	  five	  components	  of	  AP	  
identified	  in	  the	  paper:	  left-­‐right	  ideological	  position,	  support	  for	  a	  strong	  foreign/defence	  policy,	  
concern	  about	  immigration,	  opposition	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  anti-­‐Europeanism.	  
	  
Table	  A1	  reports	  the	  factor	  analysis	  for	  1983.	  	  The	  variables	  all	  load	  reasonably	  strongly	  on	  the	  first	  
factor,	  with	  the	  obvious	  exception	  of	  the	  anti-­‐EC	  variable,	  though	  the	  patterning	  is	  not	  as	  consistent	  
as	  it	  had	  become	  by	  2015.	  	  Clearly,	  in	  1983,	  any	  nascent	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  sentiment	  in	  the	  UK	  
was	  less	  coherent	  than	  it	  subsequently	  became.	  
	  
Table	  A1:	  Factor	  Analysis	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  Components	  in	  1983	  




Right-­‐wing	  ideological	  self	  placement	   Left-­‐right	  self	  placement	  (0-­‐10)	   .37	   .07	  
Britain	  Strong	  and	  Tough	   Pro	  nuclear	  weapons/not	   .60	   -­‐.16	  
	   Pro	  defence	  spending/not	   .57	   -­‐.18	  
Concern	  about	  Immigration	   Immigration	  is	  MIP/not	   .23	   .19	  
Critical	  of	  Human	  Rights	   Pro	  death	  penalty/not	   .34	   .32	  
	   Pro	  stiffer	  prison	  sentences/not	   .30	   .24	  
Opposed	  to	  European	  project	   Disapproves	  of	  EC/not	   -­‐.18	   .27	  
Factor	  1	  eigenvalue=1.12;	  Factor	  2	  eigenvalue=.33;	  Factor	  3	  eigenvalue=-­‐.01;	  chisq(21)=1670.52;	  
p=.0000;	  N=3024	  
	  
Table	  A2	  performs	  an	  equivalent	  analysis	  for	  1997.	  	  	  Again,	  the	  match	  between	  the	  measures	  in	  our	  
survey	  and	  those	  available	  from	  1997	  is	  very	  loose.	  	  On	  this	  occasion,	  all	  the	  measures	  –	  including	  
opposition	  to	  the	  EU	  –	  load	  on	  a	  single	  factor.	  	  The	  relatively	  weak	  loadings	  indicate,	  however,	  that	  
the	  underlying	  coherence	  of	  the	  AP	  dimension	  was	  less	  marked	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  than	  it	  clearly	  is	  
today.	  
	  
Table	  A2:	  Factor	  Analysis	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  Components	  in	  1997	  




Right-­‐wing	  ideological	  self	  placement	   Left-­‐right	  self	  placement	  (0-­‐10)	   .33	   .20	  
Britain	  Strong	  and	  Tough	   Pro	  nuclear	  weapons/not	   .26	   .25	  
Concern	  about	  Immigration	   Immigration	  is	  bad	  for	  UK/not	   .46	   .04	  
Critical	  of	  Human	  Rights	   Pro	  death	  penalty/not	   .62	   -­‐.09	  
	   More	  prison	  sentences	  needed/not	   .62	   -­‐.22	  
	   Life	  sentences	  should	  mean	  life/not	   .57	   .27	  
Opposed	  to	  European	  project	   Disapproves	  of	  EU/not	   .44	   .25	  
	   Keep	  Sterling	  as	  UK	  currency	   .45	   .21	  
































Annex	  4:	  OLS	  Model	  of	  Authoritarian	  Populist	  Attitudes	  in	  Britain	  
	  
Predictor	  Variable	   Coeff	   St	  error	   Prob	  
Traditional	  Social	  Values	   	   	   	  
	  	  Values	  Patriotism	   .11	   .02	   .00	  
	  	  Believes	  children	  should	  respect	  authority	   .18	   .02	   .00	  
	  	  Believes	  in	  differentiated	  gender	  roles	  	   .13	   .02	   .00	  
Reads	  Populist	  Newspaper/not	   .50	   .05	   .00	  
Male/not	   .03	   .05	   .59	  
Age	   .00	   .00	   .04	  
White/not	   .01	   .10	   .92	  
Graduate/not	   -­‐.13	   .06	   .03	  
Middle	  Class/not	   -­‐.12	   .06	   .03	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.05	   .05	   .35	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   -­‐.36	   .08	   .00	  
West	  Midlands	   .24	   .09	   .01	  
Scotland	   -­‐.05	   .09	   .59	  
Wales	   -­‐.23	   .11	   .05	  
Constant	   .63	   .16	   .00	  
Adjusted	  R2	   .37	   	   	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   1059	   	   	  
Dependent	  variable	  is	  Authoritarian	  Populism	  scale	  (mean=2.63;	  standard	  deviation=1.01;	  range=	  
0.4	  to	  5).	  Traditional	  Social	  Values	  measures	  (all	  wave	  10)	  are	  all	  6-­‐point	  scales	  based	  on	  how	  
important	  (somewhat,	  very,	  extremely)	  or	  unimportant	  (somewhat,	  very,	  extremely)	  the	  value	  is	  to	  
the	  individual	  respondent.	  	  High	  values	  connote	  high	  importance.	  	  Weighted	  by	  Weight_wave10.	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Annex	  5:	  Multinomial	  Logit	  Model	  of	  Vote	  Intention	  
	   Conservative	  Vote	  Intention	  
versus	  Base	  Category	  
UKIP	  Vote	  Intention	  versus	  
Base	  Category	  
	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .51	   .09	   .00	   -­‐.03	   .09	   .72	  
Liking	  of	  Miliband	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.14	   .09	   .11	   -­‐.24	   .09	   .01	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.02	   .08	   .75	   .46	   .10	   .00	  
Conservatives	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   1.00	   .48	   .04	   .13	   .70	   .85	  
Labour	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   -­‐.94	   .81	   .25	   -­‐.91	   .84	   .28	  
UKIP	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   .35	   .54	   .51	   .86	   .53	   .10	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Conservatives	   .28	   .12	   .02	   -­‐.17	   .12	   .13	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Labour	   -­‐.40	   .11	   .00	   -­‐.25	   .12	   .03	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  UKIP	   -­‐.02	   .11	   .88	   .32	   .12	   .01	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   1.12	   .32	   .00	   1.21	   .35	   .00	  
Male/not	   -­‐.45	   .38	   .23	   .52	   .44	   .23	  
Age	   -­‐.02	   .01	   .14	   0.02	   .02	   .20	  
White/not	   2.11	   .87	   .02	   1.05	   .94	   .26	  
Graduate/not	   .27	   .43	   .53	   1.04	   .48	   .03	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .47	   .42	   .26	   -­‐.29	   .49	   .56	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.88	   .39	   .03	   -­‐.10	   .43	   .81	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   -­‐.06	   .66	   .93	   -­‐.11	   .70	   .88	  
Scotland	   -­‐2.93	   .64	   .00	   -­‐2.35	   .85	   .01	  
Constant	   -­‐4.68	   1.73	   .01	   -­‐5.83	   2.07	   .01	  
Pseudo	  R2	   .66	   	   	   	   	   	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   779	   	   	   	   	   	  
Base	  Category	  is	  Vote	  Intention	  for	  Labour,	  Liberal	  Democrat,	  Green,	  SNP	  or	  Plaid	  Cymru;	  measured	  
at	  wave	  10.	  	  Most	  Important	  Problem	  (MIP)	  and	  leader	  affect	  terms	  measured	  at	  wave	  7.	  	  Proximity	  
terms	  measured	  at	  waves	  1,	  2	  and	  4	  (self-­‐placement)	  and	  wave	  6	  (party	  positions).	  Weighted	  by	  
Weight_wave10.	  
Changes	  in	  probability	  of	  voting	  Conservative:	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   +0.83	  
Conservatives	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	  (0/1)	   +0.20	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Conservatives	  (0-­‐10)	   +0.44	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Labour	  (0-­‐10)	   -­‐0.66	  
White/not	  (0-­‐1)	   +0.22	  
Public	  Sector/not	  (0-­‐1)	   -­‐0.15	  
Scotland/not	  (0-­‐1)	   -­‐0.29	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	  (0.4-­‐5.0)	   +0.61	  
Changes	  in	  probability	  of	  voting	  UKIP:	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   +0.48	  
Liking	  of	  Miliband	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐0.09	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  UKIP	  (0-­‐10)	   +0.14	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Labour	  (0-­‐10)	   -­‐0.04	  
Graduate/not	  (0-­‐1)	   +0.05	  
Scotland/not	  (0-­‐1)	   -­‐0.06	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	  	  (0.4-­‐5.0)	   +0.19	  
(Significant	  Predictors	  Only:	  estimates	  use	  CLARIFY	  to	  simulate	  effects	  of	  increasing	  each	  predictor	  
from	  its	  minimum	  to	  its	  maximum	  value,	  holding	  all	  other	  variables	  constant	  at	  their	  respective	  
means.	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Annex	  6:	  Multinomial	  Logit	  Model	  of	  Vote	  Intention,	  Conservative	  and	  UKIP	  with	  Labour	  as	  Base	  
Category	  
	  
	   Conservative	  Vote	  Intention	  
versus	  Labour	  as	  Base	  
Category	  
UKIP	  Vote	  Intention	  versus	  
Labour	  as	  Base	  Category	  
	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .76	   .13	   .00	   .16	   .12	   .20	  
Liking	  of	  Miliband	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.25	   .11	   .02	   -­‐.34	   .11	   .00	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.12	   .10	   .26	   .41	   .11	   .00	  
Conservatives	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   2.36	   .88	   .01	   1.24	   .99	   .21	  
Labour	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   -­‐1.18	   .88	   .18	   -­‐.57	   .86	   .51	  
UKIP	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   .80	   .69	   .25	   1.12	   .62	   .07	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Conservatives	   .30	   .15	   .05	   -­‐.20	   .13	   .14	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Labour	   -­‐.57	   .17	   .00	   -­‐.42	   .17	   .01	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  UKIP	   .01	   .14	   .92	   .33	   .14	   .02	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   1.04	   .47	   .03	   1.22	   .45	   .01	  
Male/not	   -­‐.65	   .53	   .21	   .22	   .52	   .66	  
Age	   -­‐.03	   .02	   .17	   -­‐.03	   .02	   .19	  
White/not	   3.49	   1.43	   .02	   1.85	   1.22	   .13	  
Graduate/not	   .29	   .58	   .62	   1.02	   .57	   .07	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .78	   .58	   .18	   .08	   .60	   .90	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐1.10	   .56	   .05	   -­‐.31	   .53	   .57	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   .53	   .87	   .54	   .42	   .81	   .61	  
Scotland	   -­‐3.46	   1.14	   .00	   -­‐1.74	   1.15	   .13	  
Constant	   -­‐3.79	   2.64	   .15	   -­‐4.03	   2.61	   .12	  
Pseudo	  R2	   .72	   	   	   	   	   	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   651	   	   	   	   	   	  
Base	  Category	  is	  Vote	  Intention	  for	  Labour,	  measured	  at	  wave	  10.	  	  Other	  details	  as	  in	  Annex	  5	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Annex	  7:	  Multinomial	  Logit	  Model	  of	  Conservative;	  Labour,	  UKIP	  and	  Liberal	  Democrat	  Vote	  
Intention	  with	  Other	  Party	  as	  Base	  Category	  
N=785	  (weighted	  by	  Weight_wave10)	   Conservative	  versus	  Base	  	   UKIP	  versus	  Base	  	  
Pseudo	  r2=.59	  	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .75	   .13	   .00	   .11	   .13	   .38	  
Liking	  of	  Miliband	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .06	   .11	   .58	   .01	   .11	   .95	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.16	   .10	   .12	   .37	   .11	   .00	  
Liking	  of	  Clegg	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.11	   .12	   .34	   .01	   .12	   .95	  
Conservatives	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   1.32	   .76	   .08	   .27	   .92	   .77	  
Labour	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   .66	   .91	   .47	   .72	   .95	   .45	  
UKIP	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   .58	   .74	   .43	   1.02	   .72	   .15	  
Liberal	  Democrats	  best	  on	  MIP/not	   -­‐1.46	   1.58	   .36	   .2.07	   3.63	   .99	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Conservatives	   2.24	   .15	   .12	   -­‐.21	   .15	   .15	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Labour	   -­‐.27	   .13	   .05	   -­‐.13	   .14	   .34	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  UKIP	   .04	   .14	   .76	   .39	   .15	   .00	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   1.34	   .41	   .00	   1.49	   .43	   .00	  
Male/not	   .03	   .47	   .94	   .96	   .51	   .96	  
Age	   -­‐.00	   .01	   .67	   -­‐.01	   .02	   .55	  
White/not	   2.21	   1.09	   .04	   1.11	   1.12	   .32	  
Graduate/not	   -­‐.14	   .52	   .78	   .70	   .55	   .20	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .55	   .52	   .29	   -­‐.21	   .57	   .71	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.29	   .50	   .56	   .55	   .52	   .29	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   .17	   .84	   .84	   .20	   .85	   .81	  
Scotland	   -­‐4.38	   .78	   .00	   -­‐3.32	   .90	   .00	  
Constant	   -­‐6.66	   2.07	   .00	   -­‐8.06	   2.82	   .00	  
	   Labour	  versus	  Base	   LibDem	  versus	  Base	  	  
	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .01	   .11	   .90	   .24	   .14	   .10	  
Liking	  of	  Miliband	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .36	   .09	   .00	   -­‐.06	   .12	   .63	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.08	   .08	   .33	   -­‐.17	   .11	   .11	  
Liking	  of	  Clegg	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .01	   .08	   .92	   .44	   .11	   .00	  
Conservatives	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   -­‐.43	   .91	   .63	   .92	   .88	   .30	  
Labour	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   1.83	   .46	   .00	   1.37	   .69	   .05	  
UKIP	  Best	  on	  MIP/not	   .17	   .66	   .79	   .24	   .98	   .81	  
Liberal	  Democrats	  best	  on	  MIP/not	   -­‐.57	   .76	   .45	   1.13	   .87	   .19	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Conservatives	   -­‐.02	   .11	   .84	   -­‐.20	   .16	   .21	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  Labour	   .14	   .11	   .20	   .22	   .17	   .19	  
Respondent	  Proximity	  to	  UKIP	   .06	   .11	   .59	   .10	   .16	   .53	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   .42	   .32	   .19	   .98	   .42	   .02	  
Male/not	   .56	   .37	   .13	   .65	   .51	   .20	  
Age	   .02	   .02	   .20	   -­‐.00	   .02	   .92	  
White/not	   .42	   .59	   .48	   .76	   .83	   .36	  
Graduate/not	   -­‐.22	   .40	   .58	   -­‐.97	   .56	   .09	  
Middle	  Class/not	   -­‐.33	   .40	   .41	   .31	   .54	   .57	  
Public	  Sector/not	   .64	   .38	   .10	   .33	   .52	   .52	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   .28	   .57	   .62	   .39	   .81	   .63	  
Scotland	   -­‐1.55	   .42	   .00	   -­‐3.39	   .87	   .00	  
Constant	   -­‐4.39	   1.25	   .00	   -­‐6.06	   1.96	   .00	  
Base	  Category	  is	  Vote	  Intention	  for	  Other	  Party	  (Green,	  SNP	  or	  Plaid	  Cymru);	  measured	  at	  wave	  10.	  	  
Other	  details	  as	  in	  Annex	  5.	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Annex	  8:	  Ordered	  Logit	  Model	  of	  EU	  Referendum	  Voting	  Intention	  
	  
	   Conservative	  Vote	  Intention	  
versus	  Base	  Category	  
	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	  
Conservative	  party	  identification/not	   .95	   .49	   .05	  
Labour	  party	  identification/not	   .25	   .46	   .59	  
UKIP	  identification/not	   .62	   .61	   .31	  
Liberal	  Democrat	  party	  identification/not	   .40	   .56	   .47	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .13	   .05	   .02	  
Liking	  of	  Miliband	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .08	   .05	   .07	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   -­‐.17	   .04	   .00	  
Liking	  of	  Clegg	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	   .06	   .05	   .19	  
EU	  exports	  much	  more	  to	  UK	  than	  we	  export	  to	  them	   -­‐.33	   .12	   .01	  
EU	  bureaucrats	  and	  politicians	  paid	  more	  than	  in	  UK	   -­‐.21	   .11	   .07	  
UK	  pays	  disproportionately	  large	  contribution	  to	  EU	  budget	   -­‐.21	   .12	   .08	  
Reads	  Eurosceptic	  Press/not	   .42	   .22	   .05	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   -­‐2.03	   .19	   .00	  
Male/not	   .41	   .20	   .04	  
Age	   -­‐.01	   .01	   .19	  
White/not	   .44	   .42	   .30	  
Graduate/not	   -­‐.45	   .24	   .06	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .82	   .23	   .00	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.09	   .21	   .68	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   -­‐.31	   .35	   .38	  
Scotland	   .87	   .40	   .03	  
Cut	  1	   -­‐7.64	   .94	   	  
Cut	  2	   -­‐6.73	   .92	   	  
Pseudo	  R2	   	   .41	   	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   779	   	   	  
Dependent	  variable	  is	  1=Vote	  to	  Leave	  EU;	  2=Undecided;	  3=Vote	  to	  Stay	  in	  EU;	  measured	  at	  wave	  
10.	  	  Party	  identification	  and	  leader	  affect	  terms	  measured	  at	  wave	  7;	  EU	  predictors	  measured	  at	  
wave	  10.	  Weighted	  by	  Weight_wave10.	  
	  
Changes	  in	  Probability	  of	  Voting	  to	  Stay	  in	  the	  EU:	  
Conservative	  Identification/not	  (0-­‐1)	   +.15	  
Liking	  of	  Cameron	  (0-­‐10)	   +.29	  
Liking	  of	  Farage	  (0-­‐10)	   +.36	  
EU	  sells	  to	  us	  more	  than	  we	  sell	  them	  (1-­‐5)	   -­‐.07	  
Reads	  Eurosceptic	  paper/not	  (0-­‐1)	   -­‐.11	  
Male/not	  (0-­‐1)	   +.10	  
Middle	  class/not	  (0-­‐1)	   +.20	  
Scotland/not	  (0-­‐1)	   +.21	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale(0.4-­‐5.0)	   -­‐.97	  
(Significant	  Predictors	  Only:	  estimates	  use	  CLARIFY	  to	  simulate	  effects	  of	  increasing	  each	  predictor	  









Annex	  9:	  Logit	  Model	  of	  Dissatisfaction	  with	  Democracy	  
	  
	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	  
Internal	  Political	  Efficacy	   .40	   .13	   .00	  
External	  Political	  Efficacy	   -­‐1.36	   .16	   .00	  
Personal	  Economic	  Expectations	   -­‐.47	   .11	   .00	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   .32	   .10	   .00	  
Male/not	   .11	   .18	   .55	  
Age	   -­‐.00	   .01	   .55	  
White/not	   .02	   .38	   .96	  
Graduate/not	   -­‐.20	   .21	   .34	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .19	   .21	   .36	  
Public	  Sector/not	   -­‐.06	   .18	   .73	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   .19	   .29	   .52	  
Scotland	   -­‐.39	   .30	   .20	  
Constant	   .13	   .60	   .82	  
Pseudo	  R2	   .17	   	   	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   770	   	   	  
Dependent	  variable	  is	  Dissatisfied	  with	  Democracy=1;	  not=0;	  measured	  at	  wave	  10.	  Efficacy	  is	  
measured	  in	  wave	  2.	  Weighted	  by	  Weight_wave10.	  
	  
Changes	  in	  probability	  of	  being	  Dissatisfied	  with	  Democracy:	  
Internal	  Political	  Efficacy	   +.38	  
External	  Political	  Efficacy	   -­‐.77	  
Personal	  Economic	  Expectations	   -­‐.47	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   +.37	  
(Significant	  Predictors	  Only:	  estimates	  use	  CLARIFY	  to	  simulate	  effects	  of	  increasing	  each	  predictor	  
from	  its	  minimum	  to	  its	  maximum	  value,	  holding	  all	  other	  variables	  constant	  at	  their	  respective	  
means.	  




Annex	  10:	  Logit	  Model	  of	  Over-­‐Weaning	  Judicial	  Influence	  
	  
	   Coeff	   St	  err	   Prob	  
Pro	  Supreme	  Court	  Scale	   -­‐.45	   .20	   .02	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   .65	   .09	   .00	  
Male/not	   .47	   .14	   .00	  
Age	   .02	   .01	   .00	  
White/not	   -­‐.23	   .29	   .41	  
Graduate/not	   .22	   .16	   .18	  
Middle	  Class/not	   .14	   .16	   .38	  
Public	  Sector/not	   .13	   .15	   .39	  
Trade	  Unionist/not	   .17	   .24	   .47	  
Scotland	   .11	   .24	   .66	  
Constant	   -­‐2.43	   .64	   .00	  
Pseudo	  R2	   .10	   	   	  
Weighted	  N	  of	  cases	   1057	   	   	  
Dependent	  variable	  is	  Too	  Much	  Judicial	  Influence=1;	  not=0;	  measured	  at	  wave	  10.	  Pro	  Supreme	  
Court	  scale	  is	  measured	  in	  waves	  1,	  2	  and	  4.	  Weighted	  by	  Weight_wave10.	  
	  
Changes	  in	  probabilities	  of	  believing	  there	  is	  too	  much	  Judicial	  Influence:	  
Pro	  Supreme	  Court	  scale	   -­‐.20	  
Male/not	   +.20	  
Age	   +.71	  
Authoritarian	  Populism	  Scale	   +.62	  
(Significant	  Predictors	  Only:	  estimates	  use	  CLARIFY	  to	  simulate	  effects	  of	  increasing	  each	  predictor	  
from	  its	  minimum	  to	  its	  maximum	  value,	  holding	  all	  other	  variables	  constant	  at	  their	  respective	  
means.	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Annex	  11:	  Exploratory	  Factor	  Analysis	  of	  Fourteen	  Efficacy	  Items	  






I	  feel	  that	  I	  could	  do	  as	  good	  of	  a	  job	  in	  public	  office	  as	  most	  other	  
people	  
.43	   -­‐.35	  
I	  think	  I	  am	  as	  well-­‐informed	  about	  politics	  and	  government	  as	  most	  
people	  
.69	   -­‐.20	  
I	  don’t	  often	  feel	  sure	  of	  myself	  when	  talking	  with	  other	  people	  about	  
politics	  
-­‐.68	   .22	  
I	  feel	  that	  I	  have	  a	  pretty	  good	  understanding	  of	  the	  important	  
political	  issues	  
.70	   -­‐.23	  
I	  consider	  myself	  well-­‐qualified	  to	  participate	  in	  politics	  
	  
.74	   -­‐.22	  
Sometimes	  politics	  and	  government	  seem	  so	  complicated	  that	  a	  
person	  like	  me	  can’t	  understand	  what’s	  going	  on	  
.65	   .13	  
Whatever	  its	  faults	  may	  be,	  the	  British	  form	  of	  government	  is	  still	  the	  
best	  for	  us	  	  
.18	   .64	  
There	  are	  many	  legal	  ways	  for	  citizens	  to	  successfully	  influence	  what	  
the	  government	  does	  
.25	   .53	  
Under	  our	  form	  of	  government,	  the	  people	  have	  the	  final	  say	  about	  
how	  the	  country	  is	  run,	  no	  matter	  who	  is	  in	  office	  
.18	   .51	  
If	  public	  officials	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  hearing	  what	  the	  people	  think,	  
there	  is	  really	  no	  way	  to	  make	  them	  listen	  
-­‐.29	   -­‐.32	  
I	  would	  rather	  live	  under	  our	  system	  of	  government	  than	  any	  other	  
that	  I	  can	  think	  of	  
.17	   .58	  
It	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  make	  some	  major	  changes	  in	  our	  form	  of	  
government	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  faing	  the	  country	  
-­‐.16	   -­‐.42	  
People	  like	  me	  don’t	  have	  any	  say	  about	  what	  the	  government	  does	  
	  
-­‐.33	   -­‐.49	  
Those	  we	  elect	  to	  public	  office	  usually	  try	  to	  keep	  the	  promises	  they	  
made	  during	  the	  election	  
.19	   .51	  
Eigenvalues:	  Factor	  1	  =	  3.00;	  Factor	  2	  =	  2.40;	  Factor	  3	  =	  0.82;	  N=	  2346	  
	  
	  
	  
